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AN ANALYSIS OF PLAN COLOMBIA AS IT MEETS CRITERIA FOR 
PROTRACTED MILITARY INTERVENTION 
Sarah Roper, MS 
University of Nebraska, 2001 
Advisor: Dr. Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado
For over thirty years, the conflict in Colombia has wrecked havoc on the 
country's civil society, political order, military capabilities, and the stability of the 
entire region. Bom of drug cartels and exacerbated by police and military 
corruption, rebel guerrilla groups, and ineffective international policy, drug 
trafficking and the consequences thereof pose a critical threat to policy makers 
worldwide.
Consequently, the Colombian and United States governments committed, 
in February 2000, to new legislation, entitled Plan Colombia, aimed at reducing 
narcotics cultivation, processing, and distribution by fifty percent by the year 2006. 
While the plan is ambitious, it is riddled with dangerous and ineffective military 
measures, which threaten not only the effectiveness of the legislation, but also the 
security of American troops. This research attempts to prove that, contrary to 
strategic and theoretical goals, Plan Colombia—and the international aid mandated 
therein—will only exacerbate the civil conflict in Colombia.
In search of credible evidence that Plan Colombia will only heighten 
tensions in South America, I have adopted a research strategy based on causality 
and path dependency.
Ariel Levite, Bruce Jentleson, and Larry Berman’s Foreign Military} 
Intervention (1992) provides several case studies of protracted foreign military 
intervention. From their research, I have extracted general criteria for future cases 
of protracted foreign military intervention. Next, I apply the tenets of Plan
Colombia and the context of the Colombian conflict to these criteria and explain 
the manner in which the legislation parallels Levite, Jentleson, and Berman's case 
examples. After a brief discussion of the caveats in this application, I conclude that 
Plan Colombia is likely to lead the United States into a situation of protracted 
foreign military intervention.
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2Chapter 1: Introduction
Nineteenth-century poet, Ethyl Lynn Beers, in her most celebrated work, 
“All Quiet Along the Potomac,” wrote: "Defend me from my friends, I can protect 
myself from my enemy.” Throughout history, the wisdom of Beers’ words has 
surfaced in times of war. Indeed, while the international system of war-time 
alliances has often been an integral part of peace-making, in some situations it is 
also responsible for escalations of the veiy conflict it was designed to prevent or 
resolve. From the First World War to the Vietnam conundrum, certain aspects of 
the United States’ international involvement—although well intentioned—have 
carried substantially counter-productive consequences.
Modern times are no different. As the country of Colombia finds itself 
embroiled in a civil war which centers around (and is perpetuated by) such massive 
obstacles as drug trafficking, guerilla warfare, revolutionary and counter­
revolutionary terrorism, and the blatant neglect of human rights, the United States 
has pledged ova* $1 billion of foreign aid. This aid will help complete Plan 
Colombia, the Colombian government’s answer to its internal strife. Introduced by 
Colombia’s President Pastrana in February of 2000, the plan’s chief aim is to reduce 
the cultivation, processing, and distribution of narcotics by fifty percent in six years 
(Ford 2000,2), and (claiming a diplomatic goal of mutual partnership, peace, and 
prosperity) the United States has pledged to aid Colombia in the implementation and 
enforcement of Plan Colombia.
Rafael Pardo, in “Colombia’s Two-Front War,” explains the significance of 
Colombia’s strife:
In the last 15 years, 200 bombs as large as the one used in 
Oklahoma City have blown up in Colombia’s cities; an entire
3democratic leftist party was eliminated by right-wing paramilitaries; 
four presidential candidates, 200 judges and investigators, half of 
the Supreme Court’s justices, 1,200 police officers, 151 journalists, 
and more than 300,000 ordinary Colombians have been murdered. 
(Pardo 2000, p.65)
Certainly, Pastrana’s prescribed cure-all, Plan Colombia, warrants thorough 
analysis. Quite contrary to strategic and theoretical goals, Plan Colombia—and the 
international aid mandated therein—will only exacerbate the civil conflict in 
Colombia. After carefully examining both the history and current status of 
Colombia’s internal strife, reviewing the Colombian and American objectives under 
Plan Colombia, and finally, analyzing the contradictions of the package, it will 
become clear that perhaps the cure—Plan Colombia—is more dangerous than the 
disease.
Initially, however, a thorough analysis of Plan Colombia requires an 
understanding of the Colombian conflict itself. The complex situation in Colombia 
today began to take shape over thirty years ago, and now revolves around three 
fundamental factions: the government, left-wing guerillas, and right-wing 
paramilitaries—all three of which share an involvement in Colombia’s illegal drug 
trade. In fact, illegal drug trafficking underlies the entire Colombian conflict.
In light of rising international demand during the 1970s, Colombian drug 
traffickers decided to capitalize on the country’s traditional Andean coca crop.
Drug interests financed years of experiments until, finally, an acceptable form of 
cocaine was created deep in the jungles of Colombia. This cocaine was then 
shipped to the United States and sold for up to $30,000 per kilogram (Pardo 2000, 
66). The quicker, more profitable cocaine trade began to breed drug cartels, which
4specialized in certain areas of the drug economy, including distribution, money 
laundering, transportation, and processing. Gradually, the drug trade in Colombia 
was becoming more specialized, more streamlined, and ultimately, more successful:
The growth of cartels turned Colombia upside down. In 1978, 
Colombia’s drug revenue was $2 billion. By 1985, that flow had 
increased to $3 billion—an astronomical figure, given that 
Colombia’s GNP was then only $40 billion. The wealth was 
grabbed by a few hands and invested in such safe sectors as 
urban real estate and huge rural haciendas. (This helped create the 
coalition between landowners and drug traffickers that now finances 
the paramilitaries. (Pardo 2000, p.66)
As Colombia’s judicial system buckled under the weight of corruption and violence 
sparked by this newly evolved industry, the Colombian government finally 
attempted to address the problem. An extradition treaty signed by the United States 
and Colombia in 1979 allowed Colombian nationals to be tried in US courts but it 
was met with a wave of violence from these drug traffickers. A terrorist group of 
these traffickers, the Extraditables, organized and launched an armed campaign 
against the treaty. The Extraditables assassinated a Colombian Supreme Court 
Justice, as well as journalists, politicians, police officers, and even civilians. Pardo 
(2000) summarizes:
Lawlessness spread uncontrollably not because of a lack of controls 
or laws but because the combination of drugs, corruption, and 
insurgency makes any type of control ludicrous. Colombia has one
5of the most sophisticated legal systems in the hemisphere and every 
conceivable law in the book, but 70 percent of all crimes remain 
unsolved, and it ranks among the top three most corrupt 
countries in the world according to Transparency International. 
(p.67)
By the end of the 1970s, therefore, the illicit drug trade had fully taken root in 
almost every sector of Colombian society: the economy, the judicial system, the 
agricultural arena, and even amongst civilians.
After receiving additional aid from the US under President Bush’s 
multilateral approach, the Colombian government today has effectively eliminated 
its two largest drug cartels. It seems, however, doomed to acknowledge the strength 
of a new social class—a class that grew rich through drug trafficking, that is not 
afraid to use violence, terrorism, and corruption, and that is quite willing to fight to 
keep its business alive and thriving.
Jess T. Ford (2000), Director of International Affairs and Trade, in 
testimony before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resources summarizes the explosive rate of Colombian drug production 
today:
.. .starting in 1997, Colombia surpassed Bolivia and Peru as the 
world’s largest cultivator of coca. Since 1995, the area under coca 
cultivation in Colombia expanded by over 140 percent to over
300,000 acres in 1999. Most of this increased cultivation took place 
in the areas of southern Colombia that are controlled by insurgents 
and paramilitary groups. Moreover, the amount of cocaine
6produced in Colombia has increased by 126 percent since 1995, 
from 230 metric tons to 520 metric tons in 1999. Finally, according 
to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Colombia has 
become a major source of the heroin consumed in the United States, 
producing about 6 metric tons annually, (p.5)
Just as germane to an examination of the root of Colombia’s conflict is a 
comment on the three warring factions of Colombian society. During the 1960s— 
while the rest of the global community remained in the icy grips of the Cold War— 
Colombia began developing its own variation of the conflict. Anti-government 
peasant groups in Colombia’s rural regions (consisting mostly of citizens who had 
rebelled against the government in the 1950s) gradually gained power in the 
country’s mountains and jungles . While they did cause some harm, these groups 
were not yet significant enough to threaten Colombian society (Pardo 2000, 68).
As Colombian drug traffickers became more aggressive, these peasant 
groups which had now officially assumed the name the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionaras de Colombia (Revolutionaiy Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC) 
took advantage of the situation: they settled into drug-producing areas of Colombia 
and began charging “protection” fees to the drug traffickers. In this way, FARC 
found a strong source of independent financing. Over time, in fact, FARC assumed 
control of the crops and hoisted its annual income to more than $600 million a year, 
making it quite possibly the richest insurgent group in history. Weaknesses in the 
Colombian army’s infrastructure allowed various paramilitary forces (organized to 
combat FARC) to develop. Micheal Shifter (1999), in “Colombia on the Brink: 
There Goes the Neighborhood,” elaborates:
7But the most disturbing symptom of the failure of Colombia’s 
institutions has been the exponential growth of paramilitary forces, 
now estimated to number 4,000 to 5,000 combatants. These 
militias, frustrated by the country’s demoralized and debilitated 
security forces, seek to counter insurgent advances. They have 
grown more sophisticated over the years since the army and 
landowners first organized them as self-defense units in the 1980’s. 
In some cases, they have developed right-wing political identities 
and agendas and have shown a keen interest in Colombia’s political 
game. (p. 16)
Since 1996, these groups have assumed an anti-guerilla rhetoric and employ military 
tactics that mirror those of the Colombian military. Thus, while there is no formal 
link between the Colombian military and paramilitary groups, suspicions of an 
alliance are prevalent and well founded.
The United States’ Congress’ “Human Rights Watch, Colombia: Human 
Rights Developments” (2000) explains that these paramilitary groups are 
responsible for most of the human rights violations in Colombia*.
Paramilitary groups working in some areas with the tolerance and 
open support of the armed forces continued to massacre civilians, 
commit selective killings, and spread terror...  .In 1999, 
paramilitaries were considered responsible for 78% of the total 
number of human rights and international humanitarian law 
violations, according to the Colombian Commission of Jurists
8(Comision Colombiana de Juristas, CCJ), a human rights group.
(United States. Congress. 2000)
Today Colombia stands torn between its government, guerilla groups, and 
paramilitary forces—and its citizens are the ultimate victims.
The proposed solution to this conflict is President Pastrana's Plan 
Colombia. Plan Colombia will cost approximately $7.5 billion to fully implement. 
While Colombia will provide $4 billion, the US has committed $1.3 billion of the 
remaining $3.5 billion. According to the Center for International Policy’s “The 
Peace Process in Colombia,” (2000) the country already receives more US police 
and military assistance than the rest of Latin America, and the Caribbean combined. 
In fact: “With nearly $300 million in new weapons, equipment, training, and 
services, Colombia was the world’s third-largest recipient of grant US security 
assistance in 1999” (United States. Center for International Policy. 2000).
The Colombian government has outlined six strategic objectives of Plan 
Colombia. According to the United States Institute of Peace Library, they are: to 
strengthen the fight against drug trafficking and dismantle the organizations through 
an integrated effort by the armed forces; to strengthen the judicial system and 
combat corruption; to neutralize the drug trade’s financial system and seize its 
resources for the state; to neutralize and combat violent agents allied with the drug 
trade; to integrate national initiatives into regional and international efforts; and to 
strengthen and expand plans for alternative development in areas affected by drug 
trafficking.
For its part, the United States has outlined five strategic objectives. As 
reported in “Fact Sheet: Colombia,” as released by the Bureau of Western 
Hemisphere Affairs (2000), they are: to increase support for human rights and
9judicial reform ($122 million), to pursue the expansion of counter-narcotics 
operations into southern Colombia ($390 million), to develop alternative economic 
development ($81 million) and similar programs for Bolivia and Ecuador ($93 
million), to instigate increased interdiction efforts ($129.4 million), and to provide 
assistance for the Colombian National Police ($115 million). Ultimately, the US 
hopes to bolster the peace process, ensure human rights, and provide aid to the
300,000 Colombians displaced by violence.
Although the stated objectives of Plan Colombia are certainly worthwhile, 
the package itself is riddled with contradictions. According to a release issued by 
The Center for International Policy entitled “The Peace Process in Colombia” 
(2000), approximately $21-24 million of the US monies will be designated for the 
Colombian Navy’s five-battalion Riverine Brigade. The United States also plans to 
increase funding for Colombia’s Air Force, specifically on runway improvements.
At the same time the US will continue encouraging Colombia’s Air Force to adopt a 
policy of forcing down suspected drug-smuggling aircraft by supplying it with 
American military equipment (specifically, Blackhawk Helicopters) distinctly for 
that purpose. So far, however, these plans have proven anything but successful. As 
Jess T. Ford (2000, p. 7) explains:
At the same time State agreed to purchase the helicopters, it had not 
included the funds necessary to produce, refurbish, and support 
them in its fiscal year 1999 and 2000 budgets. As a result, the 
helicopters could not be used for conducting countemarcotics 
operations and 17 of the 24 contractor pilots trained to fly the 18 
UH-lNs were laid off beginning in May 2000... .According to 
State and US Embassy officials, it will take about 3 months for the
10
countemarcotics battalion to commence operations with 
helicopters—nearly a year after the original date to 
begin operations. (Ford 2000, p.7)
Additionally, US agencies will attempt to improve the historically 
unsuccessful information-sharing practices between Colombia’s military and police 
forces. The United States itself recently altered its policy and, for the first time, will 
participate in such practices as well. The Center for International Policy’s “The 
Peace Process in Colombia” (2000, p.5) notes:
Citing guerilla involvement in the drug trade, however, the United 
States has loosened restrictions on intelligence sharing. In March 
1999 the US government issued new guidelines that allow sharing 
of intelligence about guerilla activity in Colombia’s southern drug- 
producing region, even if the information is not directly related to 
counter-narcotics. (United States. Center for International Policy. 
2000)
Today Colombia is already among the Western Hemisphere’s top three 
customers for US weapons, but Plan Colombia will designate additional sales of 
military equipment. However, this procedure has so far been disastrous:
As in the past, State and DOD (Department of Defense] will have to 
request additional funding to support U.S.-provided equipment 
Officials from State and DOD recently testified that they do not 
know if sufficient funding is available to procure the number of
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helicopters mandated by the Congress because they have 
not determined how the helicopters will be equipped and 
configured. According to State, the funding proposed by the 
administration and approved by the Congress was not intended to 
support the equipment scheduled to be provided 
through the 6-year life of Plan Colombia. (Ford 2000, p.9)
Indeed, Colombia itself is not fully prepared to receive US military assistance. Ford 
(2000) maintains that the US will provide the Colombian National Police with 
training, aircraft, and other support needed to develop an infrastructure to enhance 
their overall abilities to eradicate coca leaf and opium poppy. However:
According to Embassy personnel, the [Columbian] National Police 
have not formally approved the plan, and State has not approved the 
funding needed to begin the phase-out. Now, according to State 
officials.. .they do not know when the phase-out will be approved. 
(Ford 2000, p.8)
Even in the broadest categories, Plan Colombia has proven itself poorly planned. 
Despite the fact that the Colombian government has pledged $4 billion for Plan 
Colombia, State and Colombian government officials were pessimistic about 
Colombia’s ability to obtain much new money without cutting other government 
programs. It would seem both governments are falling short in their duties. For 
example, the Colombian government has not yet developed the detailed 
implementation plans necessary for funding, sequencing, and managing activities 
included in Plan Colombia (Ford 2000, p.l 1).
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Finally, the most dangerous tenet of Plan Colombia is the creation of a high- 
level Bilateral Working Group, which will meet bi-annually to coordinate US- 
Colombian military cooperation and assistance. As the United States pledges 
money, troops, and equipment, critics of Plan Colombia cannot help but draw a 
parallel between the United States’ future role in Colombia and its involvement in 
Vietnam. Fears are indeed legitimate.
Despite pledges to remain completely uninvolved in the Colombian counter­
insurgency movement, the United States’ involvement in Colombia’s territorial wars 
appears to be inevitable. In October 2000, the US began an offensive attack against 
the drug trade through a series of ground level military exercises in Putumayo 
(southern Colombia), and civilians are already paying the price. Indeed, local 
residents of this most volatile region face violence from the FARC, paramilitaries, 
and government forces. The FARC have instituted a transportation strike and have 
burned any cars or buses that defy this order. Terrorists have cut the electric lines 
and gasoline supplies are dwindling, while food is becoming increasingly scarce in 
Putumayo (LaFrachi 2000, p.7).
The US objective in Putumayo is to eventually replace the area’s coca crop 
with alternatives so that coca fanners and laborers will not be displaced. But even 
this seemingly legitimate goal will be difficult. Because the region’s land and 
communications are of very poor quality, most goods must be transported by river 
(which significantly limits the scope of possible replacement crops).
Additionally, even if the aerial eradication methods are successful, 
removing coca from Putumayo would only put a dent in Colombia’s drug trade— 
determined FARC leaders could easily relocate to more secluded regions of 
Colombia’s jungles. In fact, critics of Plan Colombia fear that: “any shortfall in the 
FARC’s revenues from taxing the drug trade is likely to be offset by an increase in
13
kidnapping and extortion” (“Putumayo’s Tense Wait ” 2000). Keeping in mind the 
potential for disaster in Putumayo, the success of Plan Colombia is questionable at 
best.
In addition, Plan Colombia could actually escalate human rights violations 
in Colombia. Current US foreign aid policies are guided by a series of regulations 
known as the Leahy Amendments, which deny a country’s military any US 
assistance if its members face credible evidence of gross human rights violations. 
Even so, Colombia does not face thorough scrutiny from the United States. The 
Center for International Policy’s “The Peace Process in Colombia” (2000) reports:
.. .the Colombian Army today is the hemisphere’s worst abuser of 
human rights and international humanitarian law... .the Clinton 
Administration and the human rights community view Colombia as 
a chief test case for the Leahy Law’s implementation. A vetting 
procedure, within the framework of an August 1997 End-Use 
Monitoring agreement between the US Embassy and Colombia’s 
Defense Ministry, screens unit members for past corruption or 
human rights abuse. The agreement also requires Colombia’s 
Defense Ministry to submit every six months a certification 
listing ongoing formal investigations or prosecutions of unit 
members for gross human rights violations...  .Under the 
administration’s current interpretation of the Leahy Law.. .US 
programs offer training to individuals with clean records even if 
they belong to units that are prohibited from receiving assistance. 
(United States. Center for International Policy. 2000)
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The United States has essentially bypassed the Leahy Amendments to de-link 
foreign aid and human rights conditions for Colombia. Considering the well- 
documented history of human rights violations committed by Colombia’s military, 
activist groups like Amnesty International worry that increased foreign aid granted 
under Plan Colombia will propel “an existing human rights crisis into a 
humanitarian catastrophe” (Miller 2000,1). Clearly the potential effects of Plan 
Colombia on human rights are the most counter-productive—and the most costly.
After explaining the current Colombian crisis, reviewing the Colombian and 
US objectives of Plan Colombia, revealing the contradictions of the package, and 
predicting some dire consequences of its implementation, it is obvious that Plan 
Colombia is a far cry from the panacea it was initially perceived to be. Quite 
contrary to its stated strategic and theoretical goals, Plan Colombia—and the 
international aid mandated therein—will only exacerbate the civil conflict in 
Colombia. The poetic truth of Ethyl Lynn Beers’ words is surfacing again today. 
Colombia must remember that sometimes even its friends can be as dangerous as its 
enemies.
15
Chapter 2: Justification of Model and Research Tactics
Justification of Model
Although the Colombian scenario is certainly unique, it is by no means the 
first time the United States has made the decision to intervene in another nation's 
civil conflict. Ariel Levite, Bruce Jentleson, and Larry Berman, in Foreign Military 
Intervention (1992) provide a broad survey of other examples of foreign military 
intervention: the United States in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Syria 
in Lebanon, Israel in Lebanon, and India in Sri Lanka. The authors examine each of 
the cases to formulate several generalities about foreign military intervention.
Across the spectrum of the cases studied, certain criteria remain consistent, 
specifically, the intervener's assessment errors in the decision to intervene, military 
and political miscalculations, the probable escalation of intervention, the problem of 
strategic balance, and the likelihood that intervention will continue. These criteria 
may be applicable to Colombia as well. Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992, vix) 
note:
Despite the obvious profound differences among the United States, 
the Soviet Union and Israel, we observed some commonalities in 
the dilemmas and outcomes associated with these cases. We saw 
similarities in the patterns and dynamics of the process leading to 
and expanding upon the original political commitment whereby the 
intervening power sought support from an indigenous ally in order 
to stabilize or change an existing regime. These apparent 
similarities in what otherwise might seem sui generis cases proved 
sufficiently intriguing to stimulate our interest in looking at the 
phenomenon more systematically and analytically by posing several
16
key questions. How did political-military intervention come about, 
proceed, and end? What could be learned from the phenomenon 
itself and from the several candidate cases we have identified?
These all seemed issues worthy of deeper and more systematic 
comparative study.
This Masters thesis will apply Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992) 
questions to Plan Colombia. This is an appropriate choice of models, because as 
Bennett (1999) notes, working with a specified sub-class of the general phenomenon 
has proven to be an effective strategy for theory development Bennett (1999) 
further explains that rather than trying in one study to develop a general theory for 
the entire phenomenon (in this case intervention), the investigator should think 
instead of formulating a typology of study. Bennett suggests several such 
typologies, including: “protracted” interventions, interventions by various 
instruments, interventions on behalf of different goals, or interventions in the 
context of different alliance structures or balances of power. The result of such this 
study, as predicted by Bennett will be one part of an over-all theory of intervention 
(Bennett 1999, p.2).
The study of foreign military intervention in Colombia is appropriate as it 
expands the research of Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992) to a future, 
hypothetical case. The authors touch on the relevance of future incidents:
What does the future hold? Is there really some “new world order” 
emerging, which will make foreign military interventions 
obsolescent? If so, than [sicja study such as this could be 
considered useful as analytic history, and not much more.
17
However. ..while particularly frequent during the Cold War, foreign 
military interventions are neither a new international phenomenon, 
nor are they tied necessarily to any particular international system 
structure. While no definitive answer can obviously be given to 
what the post-Cold War era will bring, there does not appear to be 
any reason to believe that the future will be fundamentally different 
from the past. Five crucial factors conducive to foreign military 
intervention—opportunities, incentives, capabilities, weak 
prohibitions, and limited alternative strategies—are likely to persist, 
and potentially even be exacerbated, in the years ahead. (Levite, 
Jentleson, and Berman 1992, p.320)
Thus the model provided by Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992) is certainly fitting 
for an application to Plan Colombia.
While particular attention is paid to the model devised by Levite, Jentleson, 
and Berman (1992), a second model also influenced the direction of this research.
In assessing the military strategies underlying foreign military intervention, I turned 
to Carl Clausewitz in On War (1943). Clausewitz focuses on the conduct of war by 
asking whether separate campaigns or battles should be viewed as a kind of 
cumulative game (in which an overall balance of success or failure emerges) or if 
the only campaign that matters is the last one and that battles are discrete enemies. 
To predict the success or failure of Plan Colombia, I evaluate the United States’ 
military strategy against the backdrop of Clausewitz’s questions. This is further 
explained in Chapter 5. Clausewitz s model proved useful in the assessment of 
militaiy tactics in Plan Colombia. However, because his research is somewhat dated 
and limited in its nature to just one of Levite, Jentleson, and Berman’s (1992)
18
criteria, his work is not used consistently throughout this research.
Research Tactics: Causal Inference in An Analysis of Plan Colombia as it Meets 
Criteria for Protracted Military Intervention
This research employs a case-study technique. In an attempt to demonstrate 
causality through path dependency, Plan Colombia will be applied to generalizations 
clarified in Foreign Military Intervention (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992). 
Causal inference will be the method employed to examine Plan Colombia.
Evidence of causality in Plan Colombia and the case studies provided by Levite, 
Jentleson, and Berman (1992) is based on temporal succession, contiguity, and the 
relation to existing bodies of knowledge.
Andrew Bennett, in “Causal Inference in Case Studies: From Mill’s 
Methods to Causal Mechanisms,” (1999) clarifies the relevance of temporal 
succession:
[T]he order in which variables assume certain values may have 
effects as important as the values of the variables themselves, and 
the effects of some processes may vary greatly depending on the 
path-dependent effects of slight differences in initial 
conditions....When path dependency is present, process tracing may 
provide a strong historical explanation for a particular case, and it 
may even allow for limited generalization to other cases following a 
similar sequential path. (Bennett 1999, p. 16)
In other words, proof of path dependency depends heavily on temporal succession. 
When two similar outcomes occur as the result of two different paths, researchers
19
must assume that initial conditions in both situations were similar.
Temporal succession is germane to the examination of Plan Colombia as the 
events preceding, the process of, and the likely results following military 
intervention will parallel those found in case studies provided by Levite, Jentleson, 
and Berman (1992).
Process tracing is only valuable, however, after the sequential path has been 
determined. In fact, there is no path to speak of (in any intervention) unless events 
can be linked causally. To do so, Bennett (1999) suggests that contiguity is 
necessary:
Events are linked via a causal chain through which energy is 
transmitted from one entity to another, and the causal chain 
connecting X and Y is only as strong as its weakest link; if one link 
in the chain cannot be made, the explanation is incomplete. Clearly, 
this source of inference also fits well with the method of process 
tracing, which seeks to establish a continuous chain of events along 
hypothesized a causal path in an historical case (Bennett 1999, 
p. 16).
In the examples given by Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992) and in the projected 
succession of Plan Colombia, the following path will be studied: 
GOALS>ASSESSMENT>STRATEGIES>OBSTACLES/MISTAKES>OUTCOME 
. Contiguity is crucial in this succession as it provides the basis for the argument 
that, although the cases may involve different players and may take place in 
different contexts the pattern of path dependency is similar, thus, a comparison 
between the case studies and Plan Colombia is credible.
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Equally important in qualitative research is the relation to an existing body 
of knowledge. Bennett (1999,17) notes: “If we find a case in which all of the extant 
theories predict outcome Y, only one theory predicts outcome Z, and the actual 
outcome is Z, then the theory that correctly predicted Z has survived a ‘tough test’ 
and deserves greater confidence.” The research presented in this thesis attempts to 
present a generalization of foreign military intervention that predicts outcome Y 
(protraction), and predicts a hypothetical scenario which could account for outcome 
Z (non-protraction).
Although these three techniques will prove sufficient as research 
strategies, the nature of the case study does require the neglect of several 
other valid methods. Covariation cannot be applied to the analysis of Plan 
Colombia, because, as Bennett notes, comparative case studies contain a 
small number of cases that are not necessarily chosen to provide a 
‘representative’ sample of some population, and thus are much weaker at 
establishing covariance between independent and dependent variables 
(Bennett 1999,14). Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992) argue that the 
cases provided in Foreign Military Intervention are representative of a 
subset, particularly protracted foreign military interventions. As a 
comparative study, the authors identify patterns rather than just single-case 
phenomenon. The existing body of empirical research is rich in single-case 
studies with considerable virtues (especially depth and richness of detail) but 
for purposes of theory-building, single-case studies also suffer from profound 
limitations. Most prominently, single-case studies often overemphasize the 
unique features of each case. In contrast, Levite, Jentleson, and Berman’s
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1992 study takes a broadly based comparative perspective (Levite, Jentleson, 
and Berman 1992, p. 15).
While Levite, Jentleson, and Berman do provide a representative sample of 
protracted foreign military interventions, this research would require a 
representative sample within all foreign military interventions for covariation. Thus 
covariation, because of its limited single-case nature, is inapplicable to the research.
Additionally, congruity and manipulability will be neglected. Congruity is 
measured using a model with a defined functional form in the hopes of establishing 
partial correlations among variables. Bennett (1999) argues that statistical 
techniques are generally superior to case study methods in establishing such partial 
correlations. Because the analysis of Plan Colombia is based on qualitative research 
(rather than statistical), congruity is not possible. Similarly, manipulability (or the 
power of the researcher to alter independent variables) is inappropriate for this 
research. Although a powerful source of causal inference, manipulability cannot be 
used in the methods of the study, as the research is social and qualitative, and the 
researcher has no power to manipulate the independent variables.
Finally, Mill’s methods do not apply to the study. Bennett (1999) explains 
the premise behind Mill’s Methods. Mill’s methods of agreement require the 
investigator to look for the potentially causal antecedent conditions that are shared 
by two cases with the same outcome. Ideally, these would turn out to be necessary 
conditions. Mill’s methods of difference require the investigator to look for 
antecedent conditions that differ between two cases that have different outcomes.
The conclusion in that case would be that those antecedent conditions that were the 
same despite differing outcomes could not be sufficient to cause either outcome 
(Bennett 1999, p. 18).
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Mill’s methods can work well at identifying underlying causal relations only 
under three very strong conditions. First, the causal relations being investigated 
must be deterministic regularities involving conditions that are either necessary or 
sufficient for a specified outcome. Second, all causally relevant variables must be 
identified and included in the analysis. Third, there must be available for study 
cases that represent the full range of all logically and socially possible causal paths 
(Bennett 1999, 17).
The first condition necessary for Mill’s methods is not met, as the causal 
relations examined in this research are probabilistic, not deterministic. Also, the 
third condition of Mill’s method cannot be satisfied because Levite, Jentleson, and 
Berman (1992) explore only one given path and only one outcome in their case 
studies.
Despite the inability to use all potential methods, causal inference as 
demonstrated by temporal succession, contiguity, and relation to an existing body of 
knowledge will prove an adequate research method for the analysis. It is not, 
however, sufficient for a thorough study. With that in mind, further tactics must 
also be utilized.
Research Design
The type of case study used in this research is a hybrid of the “building 
block” and “disciplined configurative” types. Bennett and George, in “Research 
Design in Case Study Methods,” (1997) define these two types. Building block case 
studies identify common patterns for a heuristic purpose. These can constitute 
component parts of larger contingent generalizations and typological theories. 
Disciplined configurative case studies use established theories to explain a case.
The emphasis may be on explaining an historically important case to exemplify a
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theory for pedagogical purposes. Using the work of Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 
(1992)—which is essentially a series of disciplined configurative case studies—the 
study will construct a framework of analysis. By extending generalizations to 
Colombia, the building block method will be used as well.
A second component of defining research objectives is to identify a 
subclass. Bennett and George (1997) argue that better results will be achieved if the 
“class” of the phenomenon to be investigated (e.g. intervention) is not defined too 
broadly. Most successful studies, they contend, have worked with a well-defined, 
smaller scope sub-class of the general phenomenon. The research undertaken here 
will be limited by focusing specifically on protracted military intervention.
Specification of Variables
The second task of determining a research strategy is the specification of 
variables (Bennett and George 1997). This involves answering three basic 
questions. First, what is the dependent (or outcome) variable to be explained or 
predicted? Second, what independent (and intervening) variables comprise the 
theoretical framework of the study? Finally, which of these will be held constant (or 
serve as parameters) and which will vary across cases in the comparison?
The “outcome” variable in the study of Plan Colombia will be the success 
(as predicted by the likelihood of protraction) of military intervention mandated by 
Plan Colombia. The intervening variables which comprise the theoretical 
framework of the study are numerous. They include: sources of involvement 
(military and ideological), the amount of support for the intervention (both 
indigenous and exogenous), and the intervener’s goals and expectations. As 
independent variables, the decision to intervene will be held constant and the
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goals/expectations will vary across the cases in the comparison. These variables are 
inherently difficult to quantify, and as such, measurement of each variable will be 
done in a comparative context. Specifically, I will examine each variable of Plan 
Colombia in comparison to the corresponding variables in case studies provided by 
Levite, Jentleson, and Berman.
Describing Differences in Variables
The third component of research is the description of differences in 
variables (Bennett and George 1997). Realizing that there will be a substantial 
amount of difference in the variables shared by cases provided by Levite, Jentleson, 
and Berman (1992) and Plan Colombia, die study will (for the sake of time) focus 
on qualitative differences, specifically, the contrast between prevailing ideologies. 
The majority of Levite, Jentleson, and Berman's interventions were sparked by an 
anti-Communist Cold War mentality, whereas the ideology behind Plan Colombia 
is, for the most part, an anti-drug, economically motivated sentiment.
Formulation of Data Requirements
The fourth and final task of the research strategy is the formulation of data 
requirements (Bennett and George 1997). Among the parallels highlighted by 
Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992), this research will examine the following as 
they apply to foreign military intervention: the objectives of military intervention, 
the setting for military intervention, the overarching goals of the intervention, the 
intervener’s discrete military objectives, the intervener’s assumptions at the time of 
intervention, domestic factors in both the target and the intervening state that shape 
the intervention, the doctrinal aspects of the intervention, and problems with the 
local ally.
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Based on the following generalizations, which were first discovered by 
Levite, Jentleson, and Berman, the study will predict the success of Plan Colombia: 
the intervener’s assessment errors in the decision to intervene (defined as the 
intervening state’s initial decisional flaws which ultimately led that state to pursue 
the military intervention), military and political miscalculations (defined as those 
misassessments of military and political stability in the target state which hindered 
the success of the intervention), the probable escalation of intervention (defined as 
the conditions which would lead an intervention to protraction rather than create an 
atmosphere conducive to a quick-decisive intervention), the problem of strategic 
balance (defined as those conditions that made the stability and success of the 
intervention difficult, particularly similarity of goals and communications between 
the intervening and the target state), and the likelihood that intervention will 
continue (defined as the chances that the intervention would achieve its goals and 
the chance that the intervening state would be able to withdraw as planned after the 
intervention). Furthermore, this research will extend those generalizations to Plan 
Colombia to determine if Colombian and United States actions remain consistent 
with past experiences.
Setting the Stage for Comparison: Similarities Between Asian and Latin American 
Regions and the Implications of Such for Comparative Analysis
The application of Levite, Jentleson, and Berman’s (1992) for foreign 
military intervention to modern-day Colombia presupposes several crucial factors, 
not the least of which is a parallel between the internal conditions of Asian countries 
and the conditions found in Latin America. Archival research is undoubtedly the 
most appropriate method by which to compare these contexts. Russell A. Jones, in
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Research Methods in the Social and Behavioral Sciences, (1985) explains:
Archival research utilizes the vast store of records generated in any 
literate society...to examine systematically questions and 
hypotheses of current interest... .Working with such sources of data 
has a distinct advantage... .In that sense, the use of preexisting 
records and texts is relatively nonreactive or unobtrusive... .With a 
little ingenuity and a little careful thought about what data are there, 
archives can also help you tremendously in the search for the 
explanations of behavior, for understanding why people do the 
things they do.
(Jones 1985, p. 104)
The search for such justification begins with the World Data 1995 Data set 
provided by SPSS (the most recent data set available). This data set includes the 
following countries in Latin America: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela. The following countries are included undo* the Pacific/Asia 
category: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Malaysia, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. I consider those facets of Asian and Latin 
American countries that appear to be the most salient to foreign military 
Interventions—factors which ultimately indicate internal stability. Perhaps the most 
telling contributors to a region’s stability are its development, education, income, 
and health conditions.
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Urbanity (operationally defined as percent of people living in cities) and 
gross domestic product/per capita serve as indicators of development and/or wealth. 
Literacy (percent of people who read) signifies a population’s level of education. 
Daily caloric intake, birth to death ratio, and infant mortality are all operationally 
defined reflections of the health conditions in Asia and Latin America.
An Independent Samples T-Test was used to compare these conditions. 
Table 2.1 summarizes this comparison.
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Table 2.1
Independent Samples T-Test
Variables Region N Mean T Df Significance
(2-tailed)
People living in cities (%) PA
LA
17
21
44.76
61.38
-2.09 25.7 .047
People who read (%) PA
LA
17
21
72.94
82.67
-1.44 23.3 .165
Gross domestic product/capita PA
LA
17
21
4263.00
1997.67
1.452 17.442 .164
Daily calorie intake PA
LA
11
19
2514.27
2500.16
.109 28 .914
Birth to death ratio PA
LA
16
21
3.18
4.10
-2.06 35 .047
Infant mortality (deaths per 1000 PA 17 53.88 1.18 23.10 .248
live births) LA 21 39.11
The findings of the t-test for equality of means show similarity between 
Latin America and Asia in four of the six areas. There is no significant difference in 
literacy levels (p=.136), gross domestic product/per capita (p=.l18), daily caloric 
intake (p=.914), or infant mortality rates (p=.216) between Asian and Latin 
American countries. There are, however, differences in the urbanism (p=.04) and 
birth to death rates (p=.05) of these countries. For all six of the variables, 
Colombia’s mean is less than one standard deviation from the regional averages of 
Latin America, indicating that Colombia is “typical” of this region.
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Based on these t-tests, Latin America and Asia can be considered (for the 
purpose of research comparison) similar in regard to wealth (GDP/per capita), 
education (literacy rates), and health conditions (infant mortality and caloric intake). 
While some important differences do exist there are enough similarities in the 
development education, income, and health conditions of the two regions to justify 
further comparison.
Considering that important internal conditions of the Asian and the Latin 
American regions are reasonably similar, one may logically expect similar reactions 
in both areas to foreign military intervention. Unfortunately, foreign military 
intervention is never that simple. Differences in the context of the intervention (i.e. 
goals, strategies, and tactics), technology (type of warfare), and the international 
environment all create a strong chance that interventions in Asia and interventions in 
Latin America will differ significantly. That not withstanding, the independent 
samples tests remain valuable because they give some credence to the an argument 
that any differences in outcomes are due to variations in strategies used by the 
intervener (the U.S.).
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Chapter 3: Foreign Military Intervention and its Applicability
Levite, Jentleson, and Berman define intervention as: “to interfere usually 
by force or the threat of force in another nation’s internal affairs” (T-evite, Jentleson, 
and Berman 1992, 5). Essentially, intervention is an effort to change the domestic 
affairs of the state. The authors continue:
In foreign military interventions the objective is less to control the 
territory than shape... ’die political authority structure’ of the target 
state. This is to be done in large part coercively, but nevertheless 
indirectly, through a local ally who is to be assisted in gaining or 
maintaining power. (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, p.6)
The objectives of Plan Colombia certainly conform to the authors’ definition of 
military intervention. According to the United States Institute for Peace Library’s 
text of Plan Colombia, the United States’ objectives in Colombia are: to increase 
support for human rights and judicial reform, to pursue the expansion of counter- 
narcotics operations into Southern Colombia, to develop alternative economic 
development programs and institute such programs in Ecuador and Bolivia as well 
as Colombia, to instigate increased interdiction efforts, and to provide assistance for 
the Colombian National Police (United States. Institute for Peace Library. 2000).
Granting, then, that Plan Colombia is a prime example of foreign military 
intervention, it is also crucial to distinguish between two types of such interventions: 
quick-decisive and protracted. Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992) clarify the 
distinction between protracted and quick-decisive military interventions. The 
discrepancy can be operationalized in terms of three descriptive factors. First, the
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duration of military intervention (as measured from the introduction of combat 
troops to their final withdrawal or draw-down to pre-intervention levels of 
noncombat stationed forces), second, the severity of the intervention (as measured 
by casualties suffered by the intervener), and finally, the net outcome (in terms both 
of the intervener’s intended vs. realized objectives, and of the costs he incurred) 
(Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, p. 10).
At this point it is important to note that an analysis of Plan Colombia as it 
meets criteria for foreign military intervention is a highly qualified study. Since the 
plan’s intended duration is six years, conclusions drawn concerning its efficacy and 
the likelihood of its becoming protracted will be based on its progress to date and in 
comparison to case studies provided by Levite, Jentleson, and Berman.
Broadly speaking, the study of foreign military intervention is worthwhile 
for several reasons. The authors note that the rationale for studying foreign military 
intervention is essentially twofold. The salience of the phenomenon is the first 
reason to study foreign military intervention. When foreign military interventions 
become protracted they tend to be seminal events, involving considerable 
investment of human and material resources and affecting the fate of individual 
leaders as well as the political, social, and economic fortunes of both the intervening 
and target countries. Second, quite often their consequences transcend bilateral 
context and reverberate throughout the regional and even international setting 
(Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, p.l 1).
A study of Plan Colombia’s potential for protraction is especially valuable. 
Foreign militaiy intervention has persisted over time despite the widespread belief 
that it was strictly a phenomenon of the Cold War era. While several studies have 
proven that foreign military interventions were undertaken with remarkable 
frequency during the Cold War period, this can only be partially attributed to certain
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specific characteristic of that era. For example, the nuclear balance is often cited as 
an instigator and facilitator of military intervention (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 
1992, 13). Another factor was the end of colonialism and the creation of new 
nation-states. As the number of nation-states grew, so too did the number of 
opportunities for intervention. Additionally, the difficulties inherent to the 
beginning stages of nation-building (including economic development, the 
establishment of infrastructure, and the effort to eradicate poverty) translated to 
instability for those new nations. This instability, in turn, made them especially 
vulnerable to intervention (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, 13). Yet despite the 
atmosphere of the Cold War, which seemed to breed opportunities for foreign 
military intervention, the phenomenon is not strictly limited to the past. Levite, 
Jentleson, and Berman argue its universality. According to the authors, foreign 
military interventions qualify as those phenomena endemic in the quasi-anarchic 
nature of the international system, irrespective of its particular structure and the 
particular types of domestic political systems of its major actors. And while no 
definitive answer can be given to the question of the frequency at which foreign 
military interventions might recur now that the Cold War is finally over, there does 
not appear to be sufficient reason to believe that the future will be any different from 
the past. They have more to do with the capabilities to intervene, which always 
have been there and are likely to increase in the future, and with opportunities to do 
so. Both have been present within all past system structures—and.. .are likely to be 
so within any future system structure (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, p. 15).
More importantly, a study of foreign military intervention is both 
generalizable and applicable to Plan Colombia. In the scenarios they examine, 
Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992) provide patterns of foreign military 
intervention, inclusion with variation, and structure and focus.
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First, as a comparative study, the authors are able to identify patterns rather 
than just single-case phenomenon. The existing body of empirical research consists 
mainly of single-case studies. While these may have considerable virtues (most 
notably depth and richness of detail) they suffer from profound limitations. For the 
purposes of theory building, single-case studies tend to overemphasize the unique 
features of each case (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, 15).
Second, the cases Levite, Jentleson, and Berman examine are limited in 
their type to protracted military intervention but inclusive of substantial variations in 
regard to the who, what, where, why, and how (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, 
15). Thus the case studies maintain a degree of uniformity while simultaneously 
encompassing a broad spectrum of unique situations.
Finally, there is both a structuring and a focusing to the design of Levite, 
Jentleson, and Berman’s (1992) study. The authors structure their study using three 
analytic stages—getting in, staying in, and getting out. The focusing centers around 
a common set of questions asked of each case at each stage of three levels of 
analysis: the international system, the domestic context of the intervening state, and 
he ‘indigenous terrain’ of the target state (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, 
p-16).
Levite, Jentleson, and Berman provide a credible model of protracted 
foreign military intervention with which to analyze Plan Colombia. Using the 
criteria extracted from their generalizations (goals, assessments, strategies, 
obstacles, and outcomes), we may begin our application of Plan Colombia to these 
tenets.
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Chapter 4: Criteria
Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992) provide three criteria with which to 
classify foreign military intervention: the intervener’s goals, the elites’ assessments, 
and the military strategy. Each criterion is further divided into subcatcgories. We 
begin our application of Plan Colombia to the model of foreign military intervention 
with an examination of the United States’ goals.
Goals
Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992) structure their analysis to examine the 
overarching goals of the intervening state along two dimensions. First, the authors 
determine whether the goals were reputational (stemming from a state’s desire to 
project an image of resolve into the international community) or intrinsic in nature 
(stemming from a state’s primary security concerns—the safety of its borders, the 
stability and political orientation of neighboring states, and the maintenance of a 
non-threatening regional environment). Second, Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 
classify the goals as either defensive or offensive in orientation. Defensive goals are 
aimed at preserving the status quo in the target state; offensive goals, at altering the 
status quo in the target state (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, p.248).
A look at the strategic objectives of Plan Colombia reveals that the United 
States has both intrinsic and offensive goals. Adam Isacson (2000), in “Getting in 
Deeper: The United States’ Growing Involvement in Colombia’s Conflict,” 
vocalizes the opinion of a strong anti-intervention faction of U.S. and Colombian 
citizens. According to these groups, the new assistance will arrive in a country 
fighting one of the world’s longest, most complicated, and most brutal conflicts. In 
Colombia, violence is generalized across many zones, many combatants and an 
overwhelming civilian death toll exists. Yet the United States is headed right into
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the thick of this war. Isacson maintains:
Totaling about $65 million in 1996, assistance more than 
quadrupled by 1999 to just under $300 million and will reach about 
$1 billion in 2000. The aid is undergoing a qualitative change as 
well, from a focus on Colombia’s national police to an approach 
centered on the armed forces....The proposed new aid would 
intensify all these efforts, with the largest set of initiatives— 
categorized as “the push into Southern Colombia coca-growing 
areas”—designed to prepare the U.S. created army battalions to 
operate in a known guerrilla stronghold.
(Isacson 2000, p.2)
Clearly the United States is focused on creating and maintaining a non­
threatening regional environment. Rafeal Pardo (2000), in “Colombia’s Two Front 
War,” highlights the volatility of Colombia’s crisis for the entire region: “ p]n 
addition to battling the government, the guerrillas kidnap neighboring Venezuelans 
and Ecuadorians; the paramilitaries smuggle weapons from bases along the 
Panamanian border, and hundreds of citizens from foreign countries are taken 
hostage annually” (Pardo 2000, 64). An inherent intrinsic goal of Plan Colombia is 
to stabilize all of Latin America. Moreover, there is a growing fear, even among 
Colombia’s government officials, that the crisis could spread to the surrounding 
countries. These nations (specifically Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Venezuela, and 
Panama) are all newly established democracies and cannot afford to risk their fragile 
democratic infrastructures as insurgencies continue in Colombia (“Hard Questions 
About the Coming War in Colombia” 1999, 1).
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Of course, the United States’ interest is not purely global in its nature. The 
US has, as a priority, its own security concerns—specifically as they relate to the 
rising level of drug trafficking. Plan Colombia mandates an elimination and 
replacement of coca crops. The ultimate goal of the US, is of course, decreased 
levels of drugs entering the United States, and consequently, a decline in the amount 
of drug use among US citizens. The Center for International Policy’s “Just the 
Facts: Colombia Project” (2001) explains the U.S.’s objectives:
In response to Plan Colombia, and in consultation with the 
Colombian Government [sic], President Clinton has signed 
legislation providing a $1.3 billion package of assistance to 
Colombia. Adding to previously approved U.S. assistance to 
Colombia of over $330 million, the legislation provides $8 IS 
million as an emergency supplemental for Fiscal Year 2000 and 
$256 million in additional funding for Fiscal Year 2001. The U.S. 
assistance package will help Colombia address the breadth of 
challenges it faces—its efforts to fight the illicit drug trade, to 
increase the rule of law, to protect human rights, to expand 
economic development, to institute judicial reform, and to foster 
peace. (United States. Center for International Policy. 2001)
Because the United States has drafted and approved Plan Colombia with 
intrinsic goals in mind, the likelihood of protracted foreign militaiy intervention is 
great. Isacson (2000) argues that although the more distant future is impossible to 
predict, one depressing trend seems certain: no matter what happens in Colombia, 
the amount of military aid is very likely to increase. He proposes that as the United
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States becomes more involved, either success or failure can be used to justify greater 
aid and greater involvement. If coca cultivation drops, he argues, U.S. officials will 
call for an intensification of the successful strategy. If drug production grows or the 
countemarcotics battalions suffer defeats, Washington’s drug warriors will call for a 
redoubling of efforts. If current trends continue, Colombia heads the list of 
candidates for the first U.S. military quagmire of the twenty-first century (Isacson 
2000, 11). This is particularly true because the intrinsic goals of Plan Colombia are 
so difficult to achieve.
Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992) suggest the inherent dangers of 
intrinsic goals, as illustrated by other cases of foreign military intervention.
The authors found that, in the other cases they studied, the initial decision to 
intervene was based primarily on intrinsic interests. The South Africans, Indians, 
Soviets, Syrians, and Israelis were all seeking to address security problems 
stemming from continuing conflicts in neighboring states, and while reputational 
concerns were by no means absent, but they did not assume importance until after 
military operations had begun. As dominant regional powers, each of these states 
was concerned about demonstrating its will and ability to influence the outcome of 
local conflicts. As is often the case in foreign policy, once the commitment to 
secure a specific outcome had been publicly set forth, fulfilling that commitment 
became an end in itself (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, p.248).
Thus, the United States’ military involvement in Colombia may well become a 
matter of reputation as well as achieving its intrinsic goals.
Equally important are the United States’ offensive goals (or those which are 
aimed at altering the status quo in Colombia). The second of the U.S.’s six stated 
objectives in Plan Colombia is designed to significantly change the country’s 
infrastructure via reform of the justice system and protection of human rights. As
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stated in the text of Plan Colombia, Colombia and the United States are committed 
to building a fair and effective justice system. Reforms will ensure that it is 
transparent, accessible, and independent, as effective reform is a key element in 
restoring public confidence in the state. The government will ensure that these 
increased efforts to combat drugs and armed groups will not be undertaken at the 
expense of the protection of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. In order 
to address this priority, Colombia will strengthen domestic and multilateral law 
enforcement initiatives, including multilateral investigations and joint training, and 
effective protection for witnesses and judicial officials: extradite international 
criminals in accordance with domestic and international law, improve the prison 
system to meet international security standards (including adequate facilities and a 
well-trained and professional staff): and extend multilateral initiatives to control and 
seize shipments of chemical precursors.
Under the guidance of the United States, Colombia will also work toward 
the promotion, respect and protection of human rights. Colombia’s government has 
pledged, under the coordination of the office of the Vice-President, to make a total 
commitment to the protection and materialization of fundamental rights, in 
accordance with its obligations under international treaties and pacts. As stated in 
the text of Plan Colombia, the government is complying with its international 
commitments by inculcating a deeper understanding of human rights through the 
media, and through the application of an educational model for use in the Armed 
Forces, with political and material support for the work of the human rights units 
and training for journalists in human rights and International Humanitarian Law. 
Moreover, the Colombian government is working in collaboration with the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia. One tangible effect of 
this collaboration is that the government has embarked on a strategy against
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impunity. Various inter-institutional committees have been created in the last year 
to press for the investigation and punishment of the most severe cases of human 
rights abuse. In 2000, the government established a Standing Commission on 
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, Even more, the Colombian 
government has already presented bills to Congress, which will legislate against 
disappearances and crimes against humanity and ratification of the International 
Criminal Court. Finally, there is a strategy to protect those who work in defense of 
human rights through the support of the Witnesses and Threatened Persons Program, 
and a Presidential order requires that all public officials protect human rights 
workers and support their work and that of NGO’s (United States. Institute for 
Peace Library. 2000)
“The Peace Process in Colombia,” an overview of Plan Colombia published 
by the Center for International Policy (2000) further explains that Plan Colombia 
would require the Secretary of State to notify Congress about, and to cut off funding 
for, Colombian military units that provide material support to paramilitary or 
narcotrafficking groups, even if gross human rights violations are not a direct result. 
It would also authorize $100 million to assist Colombia’s judicial system, 
government human rights institutions, non-governmental human rights 
organizations, and internally displaced populations (United States. Center for 
International Policy. 2000.).
A brief synopsis of the objectives in Plan Colombia reveals both an attempt 
to stabilize that region, protect American interests, and to alter the internal 
environment of Colombia. In short, the United States’ goals, as expressed in Plan 
Colombia are both intrinsic and offensive. Thus, Plan Colombia meets the first 
requirement of Levite, Jentleson, and Berman’s protracted foreign military 
intervention model.
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Elite Assessments
The second criterion supplied by Levite, Jentleson, and Berman in Foreign 
Military Intervention (1992) is the elites’ assessments. The authors maintain that a 
state’s decision to intervene is based upon several key projections about how the 
conflict is likely to proceed. Levite, Jentleson, and Berman focus on a set of initial 
assumptions held by elites when they make the critical decision to engage their own 
military forces. Drawing on the experiences in other examples of foreign military 
intervention, the authors distinguish three crucial elite assessments: that the balance 
of power would favor the intervening state, that the local ally would serve as a 
reliable political and military partner, and that the intervention would not 
fundamentally alter the political landscape in the target state, except as intended by 
the intervener (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, 256).
The first assumption is as follows:
Given that the intervention, by definition, occurs on the adversary’s 
territory, it is somewhat surprising that the intervening state 
regularly considered the balance of resolve to be in its favor. 
Intuition suggests and the case studies confirm that resolve usually 
favors the side defending its own territory. (Levite, Jentleson, and 
Berman 1992, p.256)
This first assumption is particularly relevant as the United States has begun 
what it calls the "push into Southern Colombia,” a targeted approach of aerial 
eradication programs and troop deployment to Putumayo (in Southern Colombia). 
Putumayo is, arguably, one of Colombia’s most volatile regions—it is a stronghold
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of the FARC. The Center for International Policy Report (2000) notes that the goal 
of the new Colombian Army countemarcotics battalions is to establish the security 
conditions necessary for the implementation of counter-drug programs such as 
fumigation and alternative development in Putumayo, One can expect that 
“establishing security conditions” will involve the first major armed confrontations 
between the new U.S.-aided military units and the FARC guerrillas. As such, 
administration officials have sought to ease concerns that the “push into southern 
Colombia” will inadvertently involve the United States in Colombia’s civil conflict. 
In several congressional hearing statements during the spring o f2000, Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Brian 
Sheridan asserted that the Pentagon would not cross the line into an anti-guerrilla 
mission. Yet, many remain concerned that this aid package represents a step over 
the line—an encroachment into the realm of counterinsurgency in the name of 
countemarcotics. Consider that armed groups’ resistance to the U.S.-funded 
strategy is nonetheless likely, and Colombia’s FARC guerrillas have already 
declared U.S. trainers to be “military targets.” In fact, the move has already proven 
more dangerous than initially thought. In November 2000, U.S. and Colombian 
officials decided to delay the launch of the “push into southern Colombia” from 
December 2000 to January 2001, contributing to concerns that security conditions in 
Putumayo were worse than planners had anticipated. Critics like House International 
Relations Committee Chairman Rep. Benjamin Gilman (R-New York) warn that the 
U.S.-funded battalions may fail in the face of guerrilla resistance (United States. 
Center for International Policy. 2000).
As recent events in the heavy coca-growing Putumayo area in the south of 
Colombia show, it is evident that the Colombian army is incapable of controlling 
any of this guerilla and coca-infested territory now, or anytime soon. Certainly,
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three new U.S. trained counter-narcotics battalions (as mandated in Plan Colombia) 
will not change this major imbalance on the battlefield. It is easy to predict that the 
start of army-supported eradication operations there will continue to be interminably 
delayed or that these operations will be reduced in scope to only small “showcase” 
interdiction or manual eradication operations with no real aerial eradication against 
the industrial-size coca plots (United States. Center for International Policy. 2000).
Nonetheless, Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992) explain that because 
often the intervening state (in this case, the United States) has as a goal to 
neutralize—and not destroy—the adversary (in this case, the FARC), elites 
consistently assume that their forces would be capable of outlasting the enemy: “If 
the intervener believes that he has superior resolve, and identifies breaking the will 
of the adversary as his goal, he also believes that military victoiy will be attainable” 
(Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992,256). It is this assumption which drives the 
United States military support for Plan Colombia.
The second elite assessment is an assumption that the local allies would 
serve as reliable political/military partners. In this case, the United States’ policy­
makers are predicating Plan Colombia on the assumption that the Colombian 
National Police and the Colombian Armed Forces will act as reliable political and 
military partners. The U.S. assistance package includes $115.6 million to support 
the Colombian National Police. A breakdown of those funds provided by the Center 
for International Policy (2001) allots $26 million for procurement, training and 
support for two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters; $20.6 million for 12 UH-IH Huey II 
helicopters; and $20 million for the purchase of Ayers S2R T-65 agricultural spray 
aircraft and OV-10 aircraft. Additionally, funds are designated for ammunition, 
spare parts, training, and logistical support. The following pages provide charts of 
the designation of U.S. funds, as mandated by Plan Colombia:
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TABLE 4.1
Appropriations of Foreign Grant Monies as Mandated in Plan Colombia, 1996- 
2000
Program
International Narcotics 
Control
Funding of equipment, 
training, eradication and 
other programs of the 
State's Department's 
Bureau for International 
Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement (INL) 
International Military 
Education and Training 
Funding for courses 
given both in the U.S. 
and in-country by U.S. 
personnel
• Expanded 
IMET
A subset of 
IMET, pays for 
training in non­
combat topics
Emergency Drawdowns 
Presidential authority to 
grant defense equipment 
from U.S. arsenal 
Section 1004 
Counterdruq 
Training, equipment 
upgrades and other 
services provided by the 
Department of Defense 
for countemarcotics 
Section 1033 
Counterdruq 
River-based
countemarcotics training, 
^equipment and other ; . 
services provided by the 
Department of Defense
Excess Defense 
Articles
Used and surplus arms 
and equipment
ONPCP discretionary 
funds
Countemarcotics support 
from the White House's 
Office for National Drug 
Control Policy
1996 actual
$16.000.000
1997 actual
$147.000: 
32 students
$50.679: 3 
students. 0 
civilians
$40.500.000
jo -
io
■■S'-"
$0
$7.591
$0
$57,000,000 $205,860,000
$885,000: $917,000
261 students 611 students
$316,814: 163
students
$41,100,000 $58,000,000
$11,775,000 $35,887,000
12.172,00.0 S ! 2 m o o o
....... .
$1,208,634 $23,565
$0 $500.000
2000 actual
$894.429.000
$900.000 
763 students
$0
$85.900.000
$24.630.000
$641.604
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Foreign Military $70,000 pre-1992 MAP funds;
Financing $7,131,000 countemarcotics FMF.
Grants and loans for Note: A special presidential waiver $0 $440,788 $24,524
defense articles, training in August 1997 released unspent 
and services. FMF valued at up to $30,000,000.
Source: Center for International Policy, http://www.ciponline.org/facts/co.htirL 2000
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TABLE 4.2
Appropriations of Military Sales as Mandated in Plan Colombia, 1996-2000
Program 1996 actual
Foreign Military Sales 
Government-to-government sales 
of defense articles, training and 
services
$10,056,000
$45.822.000
\ $19.425.000
(Deliveries) 
$27.934.542 
Direct Commercial Sales (Licenses)
Sales from U.S. companies 
licensed by the U.S. government $5,536,000
1997 actual
$74,987,000
$21.155.000
$0.935.000
(Deliveries)
$46.661.336
(Licenses)
1998 actual 1999 actual
$8,653,000
$68.226.000
$2,034,000
$8.748.000
(Deliveries)
$79.808.925
(Licenses)
$3,420,000
$1,099,000
$39,174,331 $5,216,867 $996,000
2000 esti
$252,000,
$100,000,
$10,458,0
Source: Center for International Policy, http://www.ciponline.org/facts/co.htm. 2000
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TABLE 4.3
Appropriations of Foreign Training Programs as Mandated in Plan Colombia, 
1996-1999
Program
School of the Americas 
The U.S. Army’s Spanish- 
language training school 
for Latin American 
militaries
Small Craft and
1996 actual
139
1997 actual
Training Institutions 
1998 actual
students; 15.2% of 
total
■99 students; 11.6% of 67 students: 8.2% of 
total total
Technical Training 
School
The U.S. Navy's Spanish- 
language training school 
for Latin American 
militaries,':;: 
Inter-American Air 
Forces Academy 
The U.S. Air Force’s 
Spanish-language training 
school for Latin American 
militaries
fCenteffOrHemispheric 
Defense Studies 
Defense Department 
initiative to improve 
civilians1 defense planning 
and management skills :
13 students
92 students; 14.6% of 128 students; 14.5% 98 students; 10.8% of 
total of total total
7 students
1999 actu
150 studen
6 students
Source: Center for International Policy, http://www.ciponline.org/facts/co.htm. 2000
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Judging by the allotment of military aid, the United States is certainly 
making the assumption that Colombia’s Armed Forces and the Colombian National 
Police are viable allies. According to the Center for International Policy’s “Just the 
Facts: Colombia Project” (2001), the International Narcotics Control (INC) Program 
is the largest single source of U.S. assistance to Colombia. The program’s budget 
totaled approximately $203 million in 1999, with about $195 million designated for 
Colombia’s security forces. Specifically, the Colombian National Police (CNP)— 
particularly, its Anti-Narcotics Directorate (DANTI)—has been the United States’ 
chief partner on eradication and other anti-narcotics missions. Support for the 
DANTI is “the primary focus” of the INC program. Additional recipients of INC 
aid include other CNP elements, the National Narcotics Directorate (DNE), the 
National Plan for Alternative Development (PLANTE), elements of Colombia’s 
military that are involved in counternarcotics, and other Colombian government 
entities, such as the Civil Aviation Administration (United States. Center for 
International Policy. 2001).
The assumption that Colombia’s National Police and the Colombian Armed 
Forces will act as responsible and capable allies is, in fact, a dangerous one. Levite, 
Jentleson, and Berman (1992) found that in their cases elites in the intervening state 
believed that the ally would consolidate its political position once the military threat 
had been neutralized. They failed to see that the ally’s instability was chronic, and 
not simply a function of the ongoing civil strife (Levite et al. 1992,256). A similar 
situation may well arise in Colombia. This begs the question: have insurgent groups 
crippled what would otherwise be adequate forces or has the CNP been unsuccessful 
in its previous attempts at anti-narcotics measures because it is organizationally 
inept? The following chapter will shed light on this question.
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The third and final criterion provided by Levite, Jentleson, and Berman is an 
elite assumption that the intervention would not fundamentally alter the political 
landscape, except as intended by the intervener (1992, 256). Clearly, Plan Colombia 
is broad in its scope—it is an attempt to drastically change Colombia’s internal 
environment, while simultaneously maintaining and strengthening the existing 
political infrastructures.
Unfortunately, more often than not, the assumption that this is possible is 
simplistic at best. After examining the recovery period in several case studies of 
foreign military intervention, The researchers found that the target states had 
undergone far more changes than those initially anticipated, including undermining 
the confidence of the citizens in their government, and establishing the legitimacy in 
military capability of the destabilizing group (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, 
p.257). The authors provide, for example, the case of South Africa. The country’s 
reputation in “Black Africa” made its intervention in Angola rather risky. When 
Indian troops intervened in Sri Lanka (to disarm Tamil militants), they ended up 
fighting against Sinhalese troops—a completely different faction who had come to 
resent the Indian presence in Sri Lanka. In all of these cases, the researchers 
conclude, the intervener failed to appreciate the effect that its presence would have 
on the ongoing domestic turmoil (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, 257).
The United States’ goals to altar the landscape in Colombia are lofty. The 
five components of U.S. assistance are: support for human rights and judicial 
reform, expansion of counter-narcotics operations into Southern Colombia, 
alternative economic development, increased interdiction efforts, and assistance for 
the Colombian National Police and Colombian Armed Forces (United States.
Caiter for International Policy. 2001).
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The first alteration, support for human rights and judicial reform, is 
premised on the hope of strengthening the rule of law in Colombia. A Fact Sheet 
released by the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (2000) states:
Specific initiatives include protecting human rights non­
governmental organizations ($4 million), strengthening human 
rights institutions ($7 million), establishing human rights units 
within the Colombian National Police and the Fiscalia ($25 
million), training judges and prosecutors ($7.5 million), as well as 
funding to train and support Colombian law enforcement personnel 
in anti-corruption, anti-money laundering, and anti-kidnapping 
measures. (United States. Bureau for Western Hemisphere Affairs. 
2000)
The second element of Plan Colombia, expansion of counter-narcotics 
operations into Southern Colombia, includes important humanitarian assistance and 
development components. Approximately $15 million will be allotted to help 
persons displaced by conflict in the region. This funding is in addition to funds 
previously provided by the U.S. government to international organizations (the Red 
Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) to assist internally 
displaced persons in Colombia. This component of the funding provides $10 
million for developmental assistance, including technical and agricultural assistance 
to farmers in Southern Colombia (United States. Bureau for Western Hemisphere 
Affairs. 2000).
A third element of Plan Colombia is alternative economic development 
programs. The U.S. assistance package will provide $81 million to assist small
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farmers who now grow coca and opium poppies make the transition to legal 
economic activity as interdiction and eradication make narcotics farming less 
profitable. The funds bolster monies provided for alternative development by the 
Colombian government’s “Push into Southern Colombia.” The breakdown of funds 
is as follows: $22.5 million to assist internally displaced persons, $12 million in 
assistance to local governments, $30 million for voluntary eradication programs, and 
$2.5 million for environmental programs to protect watersheds and fragile lands. 
Additionally, funds have been made available for alternative and economic 
development in Bolivia ($85 million) and Ecuador ($8 million ) (United States.
Bureau for Western Hemisphere Affairs. 2000).
The Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (2000) explains the fourth 
alteration in Plan Colombia, increased interdiction efforts. The assistance package 
provides $129.4 million to enhance U.S. and Colombian narcotics interdiction 
efforts. Approximately $68 million, the majority of the funds, are dedicated to 
upgrading the radar systems in four U.S. Customs Service P-3 airborne early 
warning interdiction aircraft which are used to detect and monitor suspect targets 
destined for the United States from cocaine source zones. About $16.9 million has 
been made available to upgrade the Colombian air interdiction programs, while $14 
million is devoted to support and provision Colombia’s riverine interdiction 
program, and $1 million to support the Colombian Navy’s countemarcotics 
intelligence infrastructure. In addition, $18 million has been made available to 
support interdiction programs in other countries in South and Central America and 
the Caribbean, as well as Bolivia and Ecuador. (United States. Bureau for Western 
Hemisphere Affairs. 2000)
The fifth and final component of Plan Colombia is assistance for the 
Colombian National Police and the Colombian Armed Forces. Before 1999, when
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Ernesto Samper was Colombia’s president, about 90 percent of U.S. assistance went 
to the Colombian National Police. The mid-1998 election of President Andres 
Pastrana resulted in closer relations between Washington and Bogota. A by-product 
of those new relations was greater collaboration with Colombia’s troubled military, 
an institution plagued by battlefield defeats and far more allegations of corruption, 
impunity, and human rights abuse than the Colombian National Police. Adam 
Isacson (2000), in “Getting in Deeper: The United States’ Growing Involvement in 
Colombia’s Conflict,” reports:
A December 1998 meeting between U.S. Defense Secretary 
William Cohen and his counterpart at the time, Colombian Defense 
Minister Rodrigo Lloreda, laid the groundwork for the expansion in 
U.S.-Colombian military cooperation. The best known (and most 
expensive) part of this effort is the creation of three 950-man 
“countemarcotics battalions” within the Colombian Army, though 
cooperation also includes a riverine program for the Colombian 
Navy and a series of aircraft and base improvements for the Air 
Force. The United States has also liberalized guidelines for sharing 
intelligence with the Colombian military, and is assisting a military 
reform effort. The proposed new aid would intensify all these 
efforts, with the largest set of initiatives—categorized as “the 
push into Southern Colombia coca-growing areas”—designed to 
prepare the U.S.-created army battalions to operate in a known 
guerilla stronghold. (Isacson 2000, p.2)
52
Plan Colombia will further increase efforts at military reform. The U.S. Southern 
Command (SouthCom) is attempting to help restructure Colombia’s army. These 
reforms, according to SouthCom’s General Wilhelm, will help to “transition the 
Colombian Army from its defensive mindset, forge a better union with the National 
Police, and improve its overall CD [counter-drug] capabilities” (United States. 
Department of Defense. 1998). The U.S. sends deployments—Military Information 
Support Teams (MISTs), Joint Planning Assistance Teams (JPATs), and 
Operational Planning Missions (OPMs)—in addition to consultation and informal 
advice with Southcom and the country team at the U.S. Embassy in Bogota to offer 
management advice, planning, and intelligence assistance—all of which are 
designed to make the army more effective.
Plan Colombia entails a broad spectrum of goals for the country’s internal 
landscape-from human rights reform, to military assistance, to crop eradication and 
replacement. Certainly, the U.S. hopes to alter Colombia’s political landscape. The 
implications of these changes, however, will undoubtedly be far-reaching, if not 
unexpected.
Strategy
The third and final criterion provided by Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 
(1992) of protracted military intervention is military strategy. The author’s define 
strategy as: “the preparation and use of military power to serve political ends” (265). 
Strategy is further divided into three tasks: understanding performance, assessing 
relative strength, and determining the larger purpose for which military forces are 
being used.
Levite, Jentleson, and Berman explain the first task of strategy. The first 
and foremost problem faced by military organizations is understanding their
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performance. It is important to remember that military effectiveness is a matter of 
relative, not absolute capabilities. Some military organizations may be more 
adaptable than others, but it is rare to find an army that is omnicompetent. As an 
example, if a force has been equipped and trained for intense armored warfare in 
Europe it is probably not as ready for guerrilla warfare in the jungle, and vice versa. 
And, in fact, in the cases that the authors examined, conventional forces were often 
being used in fighting that turned to guerrilla-style conflict for which they were ill- 
suited (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, p.266).
The second task of strategy is assessment of the forces’ relative strength. 
This can be a particularly difficult job, as the two sides involved in the conflict are 
new opponents. That not withstanding, the first battles of a military are of 
particular importance because they compose the crucial point at which an effective 
military must evaluate its tactics. In peacetime, fundamental flaws in training, 
officer selection, tactics, or the style of command can be concealed or 
underestimated. War, of course, is the most honest audit of any military force:
For this reason the first battles of a military intervention are of 
particular importance, at least if an army is capable of looking at 
itself and adapting to what it finds... .Occasionally, however, an 
initial performance may be misleadingly good—making an army 
think that its prewar tactics and command system are better suited to 
war than they really are....First battles have a way of 
creating impressions on both sides in a war that can last a very long 
time. But it is important to understand just how variable military 
effectiveness may be over time and unit types. (Levite, Jentleson, 
and Berman 1992, p.269)
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Making firm judgments about an opponent on the basis of initial engagements, then, 
is inherently dangerous. It is almost impossible to measure strategic effectiveness in 
the early stages of battle because the performance of military organizations in 
combat may be much harder to assess than is often thought.
Determining the larger purpose for which military forces are being used 
presents an even more serious problem. While most strategic analyses hold the 
political objective as a constant (e.g. to force acceptance of another states’ 
independence, to cease armed resistance, or to evict an opponent from given 
territory), objectives are inherently ambiguous, dynamic, and complex (Levite, 
Jentleson, and Berman 1992, 269). This is particularly true in foreign military 
intervention because unlike classical confrontations between two states, wars of 
intervention create particularly complicated sets of political objectives for the 
intervening power. Levite, Jentleson, and Berman note that in many cases they 
mandate goals that are difficult to put into operation (e.g., the creation of a stable 
government) and have a peculiarly open-ended quality. As previously discussed, the 
authors found that for any intervening power, one political objective that usually 
insinuates itself into war was prestige, the desire to come out of a conflict with its 
reputation for effectiveness as a power still intact. In addition, if casualties were 
suffered, it became necessary to justify the losses of those who have born the battle 
(Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, p.269).
While this will not prevent a country from liquidating an expensive military 
commitment, it will shape the kind of destruction inflicted in the latter stages of 
conflict, the willingness to maintain lower levels of commitments of personnel and 
resources even after the fighting has ended, and the general conduct of a war. Thus, 
even if the end game (the liquidation of the intervention) becomes known, its nature
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is heavily influenced by the progress of the middle game (Levite, Jentleson, and 
Berman 1992, 269).
In short, an evaluation of wins and losses under the lens provided by Levite, 
Jentleson, and Berman is almost impossible. The authors argue that the closer one 
looks at any given intervention, the more he/she finds nuanced, complicated, and 
difficultly-defined political objectives. Rather than drawing conclusions on the 
strength of forces too early in the military game, the researchers suggest analysts 
should focus on the amount of time that elapses before a client caves in, the amount 
of damage that appears to be inflicted on an opponent, the degree of losses suffered, 
and/or the dignity (or lack thereof) in withdrawal during the latter phases of an 
intervention (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, 270).
While giving the proper credence to the recommendations of Levite, 
Jentleson, and Berman, an initial evaluation of the U.S. military strategy in 
Colombia remains valuable. The key components of this strategy include: U.S. 
operational presence in Colombia, aerial eradication, countemarcotics battalions, a 
riverine program, airforce assistance, intelligence-sharing, training and exercises, 
and arms transfers. The Center for International Policy’s “The Peace Process in 
Colombia” (2000) expounds on each tenet:
Operational Presence in Colombia
Approximately 250 to 300 military personnel—mostly Special Operations 
Forces—are in Colombia on any given day. The Department of Defense maintains 
that they do not accompany Colombian forces in military operations against armed 
groups or drug traffickers. Instead, these forces carry out training or fulfill counter- 
drug detection, monitoring, and intelligence-gathering missions, most of them 
confidential.
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Aerial Eradication
The International Narcotics Control (INC) program supports a large aerial 
eradication program under the management of the State Department’s Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INI.,). United States 
contractor pilots fumigated over 65,000 hectares (160, 618 acres) of coca in 1998 
through the use of State Department-owned T-65 and OV-10 “Bronco” spray planes. 
Approximately between eighty and ninety percent of contract personnel are 
stationed in Colombia either temporarily or permanently. This aerial eradication 
program is estimated to have cost as much as $68 million in 1999, which is an 
increase of about 350 percent over the $19.6 million spent in 1996. Colombian 
guerilla groups are present in most of the areas being fumigated, and as such, the 
program involves some risk. General Barry R. McCaffrey, Director of the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy (1999) reported that aircraft on spray operations were 
hit by hostile fire, most of it smal 1-arms fire, fifty-one times in 1997 and forty-eight 
times in 1998 (United States. Senate. 1999d). For their protection, U.S.-funded 
Colombian police plains and helicopters now escort the contract pilots on their spray 
missions.
Countemarcotics Battalions
U.S. funding helped the Colombian Army to create, equip, and train a 950- 
man mobile countemarcotics battalion in 1999. General Wilhelm of the U.S.
Southern Command described the Colombian Army’s First Countemarcotics 
Battalion at a June 1999 Senate committee hearing:
This battalion is a highly mobile unit, designed from the ground up 
to work with the Colombian National Police, or other Colombian 
Army units, or independently, taking the fight to traffickers in the
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safe havens of southeastern Colombia where the majority of cocaine 
production takes place. SouthCom is working closely with the 
Colombian Armed Forces providing them guidance, advice, and 
training, as they develop these new, important and very relevant 
capabilities. (United States. Senate. 1999c)
According to a June 1999 report by the General Accounting Office of the U.S. 
Congress, SouthCom predicts that this troop would require more than $70 million 
worth of equipment and training to become fully operational. The battalion is set to 
receive eighteen UH-1N utility helicopters which the United States recently 
repurchased from Canada.
The unit’s training was estimated to cost 3 to 4 million dollars in 1999, and 
is carried out by the U.S. Army’s Seventh Special Forces Group at the Tolemaida 
garrison in the Tolima department. Including among training topics are intelligence, 
reconnaissance, indirect fire, light infantry tactics, medical skills, and human rights.
A provision that allows for the Pentagon to use its own budget to offer some 
forms of countemarcotics assistance (authorized by Section 1004 of the 1991 
National Defense Authorization Act) pays for most of the battalion’s 
countemarcotics training and other Colombian military units. Over thirty military 
teams, composed mostly of Special Forces, were deployed to Colombia in 1999 to 
train more than 1,500 members of the Colombian Armed Forces. This training 
included light infantry training for counter-drug field operations, riverine craft 
handling and safety, and helicopter familiarization.
Over the next few years, U.S. funding will pay for additional 
countemarcotics battalions. Plan Colombia includes further funds for two more 
battalions. General Wilhelm of SouthCom said in September 1999 that he will
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“encourage Colombia’s military leaders to expand the concept and create a counter­
drug brigade. The average Colombian army brigade has eight battalions” (United 
States. Senate. 1999c).
Riverine Program
As authorized by Section 1033 of the 1998 National Defense Authorization 
Act, a riverine counter-drug program will use defense budget funds to improve the 
Colombian Navy’s ability to control traffic on rivers. This program (which will run 
from 1998 to 2002) works mainly in the Amazon basin area of Southern Colombia, 
where coca is grown and guerillas are numerous.
The program pays for spare parts, infrastructure improvements, and training 
for Riverine Combat Elements (RCEs). Additionally, it has helped the Colombian 
Navy create a new Riverine Brigade. In 1998, President Pastrana personally 
activated the new Riverine Brigade and its five battalions. Earlier, the Colombian 
Navy launched its first indigenous support or “mothership.” The program spent 
approximately $11 million in Section 1033-authorized funds.
Naw Assistance
One element of U.S. support for Colombia’s Air Force is a program to 
upgrade its fleet of A-37 “Dragonfly” intercept aircraft. The Dragonfly, according to 
a U.S. Air Force website, is “intended for use in counterinsurgency operations” 
(United States. Air Force. 2001). The State Department INC program contributed 
$14 million in “Weston Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act” funds to the A-37 
upgrade effort in 1999. According to the Pentagon drug policy director, Brian 
Sheridan, the Defense Department spent an additional $7 million in 1999-$5 
million in upgrades and $2 million on A-37 training for Colombian pilots (United 
States. Senate. 1999b).
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Intelligence Sharing
The United States supported the establishment of a Colombian Joint 
Intelligence Center (JIC), which is based in Tres Esquinas alongside the Army 
countemarcotics battalion, in an effort to improve information sharing between 
Colombian police and military units;. Personnel for the center underwent training 
and the facility became operational in December of 1999.
Certain circumstances dictate that the U.S. may share intelligence with the 
Colombian military and police. Previously, United States officials avoided 
transferring intelligence about guerilla activity unless it directly pertained to 
counter-drug operations: a June 1998 guidance allowed U.S. personnel to share 
intelligence about guerrilla capabilities and activities only if directly related to 
approved countemarcotics operations.
U.S. officials have recently loosened guidelines, however, citing guerrilla 
involvement in the drug trade. The U.S. government issued new guidelines in 
March 1999 that allow U.S. personnel to provide intelligence about guerrilla activity 
to military and police units in Colombia’s southern drug-producing region, even if 
the information is not directly related to countemarcotics operations.
Training and Exercises
Colombian Armed Forces participated in several Sponsored-sponsored 
training exercises and seminars in 1998 and 1999, including Fuerzas Aliadas Chile, 
Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarian, UNIT AS, and United Counterdrug. A Medical 
Readiness Training Team (MEDRETE) offered health services in the town of 
Honda in the Tolima department in September 1999.
Arms Transfers
Colombia’s security forces also receive grants of weapons and equipment 
through emergency countemarcotics drawdowns. A drawdown in September 1999
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included $58 million of spare parts, equipment, fuel, weapons, and ammunition for 
the Colombian military and police (United States. White House. 1999).
Colombia is among the hemisphere’s top three customers for U.S. weapons 
through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, and the top five customers for 
Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) purchases. The country recently purchased eleven 
UH-60 “Blackhawk” and twelve “Sioux” training helicopters, small arms, spare 
parts, vehicles and ammunition. In an unusual move, the Export-Import Bank of the 
United States debated financing $20 million for the sale of fourteen Blackhawk 
helicopters and several different weapons and spare parts (United States.
Department of Defense. 1999).
Undoubtedly, the United States military strategy is a comprehensive one. 
While it encompasses a broad scope of tactics and missions, the efficacy of this 
strategy is contingent upon cooperation from the Colombian National Police and the 
aerial eradication efforts, countemarcotics battalions, riverine programs, navy 
assistance, intelligence sharing, training and exercises are all attempts of the United 
States to meet its three tasks: to understand performance, to assess relative strength, 
and to determine the larger purpose for which military forces are being used. Thus, 
the military strategy in Plan Colombia fits the third and final criterion of protracted 
military intervention.
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Chapter 5: Dangers of Plan Colombia as it Meets Said Criteria
Considering the previous criteria, and the manner in which Plan Colombia 
fits those conditions for protracted military intervention, one may logically assume 
that the United States’ intervention in Colombia will not be a short-lived, neat 
intervention. Rather, the United States’ is likely to find itself involved in several 
aspects of Colombia’s internal turmoil. In this case, the intervening state and the 
target state both fit general models of protracted military intervention. There are, 
however, even more dangerous situations in Colombia that exacerbate the likelihood 
of protraction and the degree of damage that may be wrought on both countries 
during the implementation of Plan Colombia. Among these conditions are 
ambiguous goals and objectives, instability in the target state, and a lack of military 
effectiveness.
Ambiguous Goals
Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992) argue that one of the key difficulties 
facing elites in intervening states was the task of translating political goals into 
military objectives. Defining concrete operational objectives which would enable 
the intervener to achieve its broader political goals proved especially difficult 
because military force to attain military objectives is far more realistic than using 
military force to achieve political objectives. The objectives in Plan Colombia are 
broad, ambiguous political goals.
The first objective-to strengthen the fight against drug trafficking and to 
dismantle the trafficking organizations through an integrated effort by the armed 
forces-includes plans to combat illicit cultivation through continuous and 
systematic action of both the military and police forces, to establish a military 
control of Southern Colombia for eradication, and to establish government control 
over key drug production areas.
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The second objective—to strengthen the judicial system and combat 
corruption—encompasses more narrow goals of strengthening the institutions of the 
Prosecutor’s office, the courts, public defenders and human rights units, reinforcing 
and training the police investigating corps, supporting the anti-corruption groups 
responsible for the investigation of civil servants, reforming the prison system, 
applying extradition laws, and obtaining a proposal for oral trials in criminal cases 
(in the meantime, drafting regulations for the present criminal procedures of public 
trials).
Neutralizing the drug trade’s financial system and seizing its resources for 
the state compose the third objective in Plan Colombia. Specifically, Colombia 
hopes to strengthen counter-smuggling efforts, cany out a vigorous asset seizure 
program, and freeze and interdict bank accounts and assets in Colombia and abroad.
The fourth objective—neutralizing and combating violence agents allied 
with the drug trade—includes plans to increase security for citizens against 
kidnapping, extortion, and terrorism, and to halt the acquisition of arms by those 
groups that profit from drug trafficking through a concerted international effort.
Objective five—to integrate national initiatives into regional and 
international efforts—serves as an umbrella for the more narrow goals of sharing 
information and intelligence with other agencies in the country, and contributing to 
and coordinating with regional and international operations and efforts.
Finally, the sixth objective—strengthening and expanding plans for 
alternative development in areas affected by drug trafficking—includes plans to 
provide job opportunities and social services to people living in the cultivation zones 
and to promote public information campaigns on the dangers of illegal drugs.
Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992), explain the dangers of these 
ambiguous goals. While the beginning phases of the intervention were usually
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guided by narrow, concrete objectives that served as the focal point for operations, 
these objectives did not sustain the intervention. As the conflict dragged on military 
objectives became more amorphous and less narrowly specified. When initial 
setbacks occurred, the intervener, rather than focusing on the protection of key cities 
or strategic points, tended to redefine its mission as destroying the will of the 
adversary, convincing him that victory was not attainable. It was this objective 
which played a key role in convincing the intervening state to switch from defensive 
to offensive tactic and to increase its commitment of combat personnel. Levite, 
Jentleson, and Berman (1992) conclude that in combination with the rising 
importance of reputational goals, this dynamic provided a key source of escalatory 
pressure (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, p.250). The United States and 
Colombia may also find pressure building as they will undoubtedly have trouble 
attaining the broad political objectives outlined in Plan Colombia through military 
force. The Center for International Policy’s “Just the Facts: Colombia Project” 
(2001) notes:
Several members of Congress have questioned what they perceive 
as a lack of clear, measurable objectives for the new assistance to 
Colombia and its neighbors. Solid benchmarks for determining the 
program’s success remain elusive. ...By October, the White House 
could still only report that specific, quantifiable objectives were 
being negotiated with the Government of Colombia. According to 
the GAO [General Accounting Office], the Colombian government 
bears much of the blame for the lack of clarity about goals.
(United States. Center for International Policy. 2001)
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Even U.S. officials realize the amorphous nature of Plan Colombia. In a hearing of 
the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Edward Jurith, Acting 
Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (2001) attempted to justify 
the ambiguity of Plan Colombia:
It’s a dynamic process [policy-making]. We have had successes.... 
at the same time we need to be just as robust and flexible in terms 
of what we do in the source countries and in the transit zones. We 
are seeing success we believe in our operations in the Andes, 
reducing the overall level of production in the Andean region.
Again, the bottom line I think is it’s not a question of winning or 
losing; it’s a question of how do we adapt to the threat? How do we 
adapt to the changes in both drug consumption and drug trafficking 
patterns? (United States. Senate. 2001)
Unless the United States and Colombia both take Mr. Jurith’s advice and treat the 
political objectives of Plan Colombia as the inherently ambiguous goals that they 
are, both countries will fall prey to frustration and pressure, which may ultimately 
increase the likelihood of protracted conflict.
Colombian Accountability
Additionally, as noted by Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992) the internal 
stability of the target state is a crucial variable in the success or failure of any 
military intervention (1992, 256). The mistaken assumption that Colombia is 
sufficiently stable to withstand and cooperate in Plan Colombia could veiy well 
doom military operations in the region.
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Several indications of the country’s instability have been ignored by policy­
makers who support Plan Colombia. A Capitol Hill Hearing of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on October 6, 1999 contains the testimony of Thomas 
Pickering, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, wherein he claims that 
Colombia’s internal conflict (which has been the longest-standing in the 
hemisphere) has its roots in civil strife going back to the 1950s and has developed 
over the nearly 40-year period into a broad scale conflict (1999). Representative 
Patsy Mink (D-HI) best summarized Colombia’s instability in a Hearing of the 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources Subcommittee of the House 
Government Reform Committee on October 12,2000:
At the same time, armed insurgent groups are increasingly involved 
in the drug trade, and the government doesn’t have control over 
almost half of the country. All of this is against the backdrop of a 
country that has been fighting a civil war for decades, a war that has 
killed tens of thousands of people and displaced over a million. 
Media accounts of human rights abuses, kidnappings, and internal 
refugees in Colombia have become all too common.
(United States. House. 2000)
Colombia’s internal strife is already hindering the success of Plan 
Colombia. As Jess T. Ford of the General Accounting Office National Security and 
International Trade Division noted in the same House Hearing, the Colombian 
government has not yet shown that it has the detailed plans and funding necessary to 
achieve the goals of Plan Colombia (Ford 2000). Colombia faces continuing 
challenges associated with its political and economic instability fostered by the
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long-term, long-standing insurgency and the need for the police and the militaiy to 
comply with human rights standards. Moreover, the U.S. Embassy has made no 
significant progress in the implementation of a plan to have the Colombian National 
Police assume more responsibility for the aerial eradication program. Embassy 
officials have expressed concern that the CNP have not always provided 
documentation to show the use of some of the assistance. Overall, the U.S. and 
Colombian governments face a number of challenges in management and financing 
of Plan Colombia over the next six years. Although both governments are taking 
actions to address the challenges, at this point the total cost in activities required to 
meet the plan’s goals remains unknown, and significantly reducing drug activities 
may take several more years than additionally thought (Ford 2000).
Colombia’s internal instability contradicts the United States’ assumption 
that the region will act as an ally and consolidate its political position once the 
military threat of guerilla groups is neutralized. In fact, Colombia’s position is quite 
to the contrary. Colombian and United States officials are hoping that Plan 
Colombia will create and maintain internal stability. President Pastrana believes and 
the United States government agrees that ending civil conflict and eliminating all of 
that conflict’s harmful side effects is a central issue in solving Colombia’s 
multifaceted problems. The idea is that Plan Colombia would stabilize the nation by 
helping Colombia’s economic recovery, allowing for further improvements in the 
protection of human rights, and further easing efforts to deal with the narcotics 
problem. In a perfect situation, Plan Colombia would also restore Colombian 
government authority and control in the now vacated coca-growing regions.
Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992) note that internal stability is a 
necessary prerequisite for successful intervention. Given the fact that Plan 
Colombia touts stability as an end goal (not a precursor) of the intervention, the
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probability of protraction is higher than it might otherwise be. In fact, because Plan 
Colombia is a joint effort between the United States and Colombia, the United 
States is reliant on Colombia to meet its outlined goals—otherwise, the intervention 
will surely fail. Recall that, as Ford testifies, the Colomhian government has yet to 
develop the detailed implementation plans necessary for funding, sequencing, and 
managing those strategies included in Plan Colombia (Ford 2000,11). What is 
more, the Colombian National Police have not yet formally approved the phase-out 
aspects of Plan Colombia (Ford 2000, 8). Clearly, the chance that Colombia may 
fail to meet the expectations mandated in Plan Colombia is viable.
Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992) argue that an effort to reshape the 
body politic of a nation is a broad, ambitious, and open-ended undertaking. This 
involves installing or maintaining in power favored leaders, yet, even if successful, 
this is not a sufficient basis for achieving the principle objectives in the intervention. 
This, is where the “hearts and minds” problem of translating political goals into 
military objectives becomes problematic. As such, there is a greater need for the 
local ally to have an independent base of power and an indigenously credible basis 
of legitimacy and political appeal to his own people (Levite, Jentleson, Berman 
1992,317).
Without the cooperation of Colombia, the United States’ efforts to reduce 
drug trafficking and to institute internal stability are futile. The nature of Plan 
Colombia dictates a joint effort between the intervening state and the target state. 
Attempts at massive internal reforms demand the full cooperation of the Colombian 
government and the Colombian National Police—in instituting those changes, 
enforcing the new laws, and maintaining an environment conducive to reform.
Again, without this support, Plan Colombia will fail.
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Levite, Jentleson, and Berman expound on the historical examples of 
instability in the target state and the results that instability effected. The authors 
found that in quite a few cases, the local ally was unreliable in the first place, that 
appealing for external assistance was an attempt to make up for a lack of domestic 
political support and military weakness. In other cases, the local ally may have had 
some credibility and reliability at the outset of the intervention, but it increasingly 
lost those in the process of the intervention—either because the association with an 
outside power discredited the target state, or because the target state was inclined to 
brutality or complacency once it had secured the commitment of an outside 
intervener. The authors conclude that this is just another version of the United 
States9 “free rider” problem (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, 309).
Military Ineffectiveness
A third telling factor in the likely failure of Plan Colombia is the lack of 
military effectiveness—both in Colombia’s armed forces and the United States 
military assistance tactics. Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992) re-examined the 
strategic assumptions in their set of case studies to formulate three dimensions in 
which the intervening state often miscalculated its military effectiveness. Initially, 
intelligence communities demonstrated a glaring inability to gather accurate and 
reliable information about political, as opposed to militaiy, variables. As a result, 
the intervening states were stymied not by an inadequacy of force but by political 
developments—involving both the local ally and adversaiy—that undermined then- 
broad political/military strategy. Next, elites in intervening states consistently 
overestimated the value of superior firepower. They assumed that military 
superiority would allow them to overwhelm the adversary and destroy his 
willpower. To their surprise, however, guerrilla tactics repeatedly offset numerical 
and technological advantages and took their toll on the willpower of the
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intervening army. Even successful military campaigns could not translate into 
stable political outcomes. Even military force was ineffective at altering domestic 
alignments. The authors note: “In all of our cases, the complexities and intractable 
nature of civil war left even the most powerful of foreign interveners strangely 
impotent” (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, 258). Finally, elites consistently 
failed to recognize the effect domestic politics would have on their behavior.
Levite, Jentleson, and Berman found that as the operation dragged on and the 
financial and human toll mounted, domestic costs played a key role in hampering 
the prosecution of war (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, p.258).
For its part as the intervener, the United States has already made several of 
these same mistakes. Initially, efforts to bolster intelligence sharing do not 
guarantee that the information will be reliable, accurate, or appropriate. Under 
certain circumstances, personnel from the United States share intelligence with the 
CNP and the Colombian Armed Forces. Although the U.S. has, until recently, 
avoided transferring intelligence about guerrilla activity that was unrelated to 
countemarcotics operations, the U.S. helped found a new Colombian Joint 
Intelligence Center (JIC), based at Tres Equinas. Adam Isacson proposes, in 
“Getting in Deeper: The United States’ Growing Involvement in Colombia’s 
conflict,” (2000) that this policy owed not to discomfort with such direct 
involvement in the conflict, but also to concern about recipients’ use of the 
information. It could, for example, be passed on to paramilitary groups for actions 
against civilian populations (2000, 6).
Second, proponents of Plan Colombia believe that U.S. equipment is both 
sufficient and necessary for countemarcotics missions. The Center for International 
Policy provides the following U.S. aid proposals for 2002:
TABLE 5.1
Colombia’s Social and Economic Aid, Proposed for 2002
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0
1998 0.02 0 0 0.5 0.52
1999 3 0 0 0 5.75 8.75
2000 '4 ^ : ^  ■ ■ 0 0 208 212
2001 0 0 0 0 5 5
2002 0 ; ::^ b - 0 0 146.5 146.5
Source: http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/ai<i02.htm
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TABLE 5.2
Colombia’s Military and Police Aid, Proposed for 2002
1997 33.45 30 ........ 0 ......... 14.2 10.32 ' ........ 0 ........ 0.5 0.09 88.56
1998 0.89 41.1 11.78 2.17 ■■ '■' '.'b 0 112.44
1999 200.11 0.44 0.92 58 35.89 13.45 o ..... ' 0 ..’ 308.81
f2000 686.43 0.4 24.63 :" 1 ? 0  " 798.26
2001 43 0.42 1.04 29 60.9 19.04
o
0 153.40
2002 252.5 0.42 1.18 : 29 60.9 19.04 0 0 363.04
Source: http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid02.htm
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As illustrated by tables, the United States is devoting massive amounts of monies to 
aid Colombia. Whether this aid takes the form of social, economic, military, or 
police programs, American dollars are projected to further increase in the upcoming 
years. Recall the work of Clausewitz in On War (1943), in which he argues that the 
fog of war—the sheer difficulty of figuring out what is realty happening in 
wartime—is the most pressing challenge for policy-makers. A review of the 
proposed aid (economic, social, military, and police) indicates that the United States 
is indeed “getting in deeper.”
This is reminiscent of Clausewitz’s argument: as Plan Colombia progresses, 
the U.S. is becoming more and more involved in the middle game. The fog of war 
has made it increasingly difficult for the U.S. to objectively determine the probable 
escalation of its involvement.
At this point, a criticism of the U.S. policy from the standpoint of policy 
design and implementation is also warranted. The delivery, use, and maintenance of 
this military equipment to date have proven disastrous. Representative John Mica 
(R-FL) noted in a Hearing of the Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human 
Resources Subcommittee of the House Government Reform Committee on October 
12, 2000:
This administration has also resisted congressional efforts to ensure 
that needed drug-fighting equipment makes it to Colombia in a 
timely manner. The administration has fought the Congress for 
years on the Blackhawk utility helicopters for the Colombian 
National Police and has a pathetic track record for delivering this 
type of assistance. And that type of assistance, incidentally, is the 
main part of the package, the $1.3 billion package, at least
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the anti-narcotics portion of it. In fact, even three helicopters, 
which accounts for the bulk of aid dollars in Fiscal Year 1999, 
when finally delivered to the Colombian National Police, sat idle 
for lack of proper floor armoring and ammunition (United States. 
House. 2000)
Moreover, Jess T. Ford (2000), Director of International Affairs and Trade 
in the General Accounting Office, maintains that some of the problems that have 
arisen with the transfer of military equipment. While the Department of Defense 
agreed to provide $3.1 million worth of spare helicopter parts, for instance, only 
$378,000 worth had been delivered as of September 1,2000. Department of 
Defense officials did not know when they would deliver the remaining parts. 
Furthermore, while the State Department agreed to purchase 33 UH-1N helicopters 
for Colombian countemarcotics battalions, it had not included the funds necessaiy to 
procure, refurbish, and support the equipment in its fiscal year 1999 and 2000 
budgets. As a result, the helicopters could not be used for conducting 
countemarcotics operations and 17 of the 24 pilots trained to fly the 18 UH-lN’s 
were laid off in May 2000. In 1996, the Department of Defense agreed to provide 
the Colombian military and CNP with 90 secure radios and supporting 
communications equipment from its inventories, but this equipment was never made 
available. Finally, the United States Embassy has developed a plan to have the 
Colombian National Police assume increased operational control over the aerial 
eradication program. This was to be accomplished by providing the CNP with 
training, aircraft, and other support needed to develop an infrastructure to enhance 
their overall eradication capabilities. According to Embassy personnel, however, 
the National Police have not yet formally approved the plan, and the State
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Department has not approved the funding needed to begin the phaseout. Ford 
concludes: “According to U.S. Embassy officials, despite extensive training and 
other efforts to have the National Police develop a management program that would 
ensure a more effective aerial eradication program, little progress has been made” 
(Ford 2000, 8).
That not withstanding, even if the military equipment had been delivered as 
planned and troops were adequately prepared to assume military responsibility, the 
assumption that countemarcotics missions would be successful would still be hasty. 
As Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992,258) note, guerrilla warfare repeatedly 
counteracts technological advantages. The Center for International Policy’s “Just 
the Facts: Colombia Project” (2001) contains the testimony from House 
International Relations Committee Chairman, Rep. Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), who 
warns that the U.S. funded countemarcotics battalions may fail in the face of 
guerrilla resistance:
As recent events in the heavy coca-growing Putomayo (sic) area 
in the south of Colombia show, it is evident that the Colombian 
army is incapable of controlling any of this guerrilla and coca- 
infested territory now, or anytime soon. Certainly, three new U.S. 
trained counter-narcotics battalions of the Colombian army alone, 
will not change this major imbalance on the battlefield... .[OJne can 
easily predict that either the start of army-supported eradication 
operations there will continue to be interminably delayed, or that 
these operations will be reduced in scope to only small “show case” 
interdiction or manual eradication operations (with no real aerial 
eradication against the industrial-size coca plots). (United States.
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Center for International Policy. 2001)
Undoubtedly, the United States is guilty of several military assessment errors which 
will profoundly influence the progress of Plan Colombia.
As a matter of fact, there is good reason to believe that the United States 
intervention in Colombia, as mandated by Plan Colombia, will result in a protracted 
foreign military intervention. The objective of the Colombian Army 
countemarcotics battalions is to establish the security conditions needed to 
implement counter-drug programs such as fumigation and alternative development 
in Putumayo. Critics of Plan Colombia firmly believe, however, that efforts to 
eradicate crops which are maintained by guerrilla forces (specifically the FARC) 
will propel U.S. forces into a counterinsurgency mission. Experts maintain that the 
establishment of security conditions will involve the first major armed 
confrontations between the new U.S.-aided military units and FARC guerrillas 
(United States. Center for International Policy. 2001). In an effort to ease concerns 
that United States forces will be lured into Colombia's counterinsurgency violence, 
the United States has hired civilian contractors to carry out dangerous eradication 
missions. At the same time, however, U.S. military personnel are in Colombia to 
carry out training, intelligence-gathering, and technical assistance missions. In 
1999, the monthly United States troop strength in Colombia was approximately 209 
soldiers. This number has jumped in late 2000 and early 2001 due to the ongoing 
effort to train countemarcotics battalions and to implement other initiatives foreseen 
in the aid package. The Center for International Policy (2001) explains this strategic 
use of civilian contractors and military personnel. The supplemental budget does 
not provide funds for the assignment of U.S. military personnel or civilian 
contractors to Colombia unless their assignment mandates less than 500 troops or
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300 contractors to be present at one time. This “troop cap” is inapplicable, however 
to other funds (for example the Defense Department’s budget or regular 
countemarcotic operations in Colombia). Another caveat remains in that the cap 
may be exceeded for ninety days if U.S. military personnel are involved in 
hostilities or if circumstances indicate that their involvement in hostilities is 
imminent (United States. Center for International Policy. 2001). Critics worry 
that, because they are not official representatives of the U.S. government in 
Colombia, the contractors are less accountable than uniformed military personnel. 
Consequently, there is concern that contractors may come to fill roles that go 
beyond the narrow counter-drug mission, and that since contractor casualties would 
be less controversial, they may be called upon to perform tasks and operate in zones 
that would be off-limits to regular government or military officials (United States. 
Center for International Policy Country Report. 2001).
A press release from Representative Janice Schakowsky (D-IL), on April 
25, 2001 ((http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/querv/D7clQ7:1 :./temp/~cl07zpRN6C:: 
2001) claims that currently taxpayer funds are used to pay private companies 
millions of dollars to fight the war on drugs in the Andean region. Schakowsky 
claims:
The American taxpayers are funding a secret war that could suck us 
into a Vietnam-like conflict. Those private military contractors are 
not held accountable for their actions, and may draw the U.S. 
deeper into regional conflicts and civil wars. The public has a right 
to know that the Defense Department is outsourcing dangerous 
missions to private armies that operate free from public scrutiny. Is 
the U.S. military privatizing its missions in order to avoid public
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controversy or embarrassment? Is it to hide body bags from the 
media and thus shield them from public opinion? (United States. 
The Center for International Policy. 2001)
Whatever the motivations behind this outsourcing, Schakowsky and other 
members of Congress have taken legislative action to prevent what they see as the 
first steps in protraction. Schakowsky introduced House Resolution 1591 on April 
25,2001 to prohibit the United States from providing financing for 
nongovernmental organizations or individuals to carry out military, law 
enforcement, armed rescue, or other related operations in the countries of the 
Andean Region, including any operations relating to narcotics control efforts (the 
text of the bill, which has currently been referred to the House Committee on 
International Relations, can be found in the appendix immediately following 
Chapter 7). HR 1591 demonstrates the rising public sentiment that the United States 
is quickly heading toward protracted military intervention in Colombia, and it 
represents one of those “domestic factors” that Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 
(1992) argue may shape the nature of a foreign military intervention..
Having defined the criteria of protracted military intervention and showing 
that Plan Colombia meets those criteria, it is logical to conclude that the United 
States is entering into an historically dangerous situation. Several external factors 
(i.e. ambiguity of goals and objectives, internal instability, and military 
miscalculations) only heighten the chance of the United States’ inevitable military 
involvement in Colombia’s counterinsurgency missions—and such involvement 
equates, in simple trams, to protraction.
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Chapter 6: Caveats
This thesis would not be complete without a discussion of the caveats in 
research methods and in the application of Levite, Jentleson, and Berman's model.
A comprehensive examination of the research strategies reveals certain 
complications that, because of Plan Colombia's extended duration, must be 
considered thoroughly.
Initially, one must remember Andrew Bennett's (1999) argument:
.. .the order in which variables assume certain values may have 
effects as important as the value of the variables themselves, and the 
effects of some processes may vary greatly depending on the path- 
dependent effects of slight differences in initial conditions. This 
poses particular difficulties for most forms of statistical analysis.
The process tracing method in case studies is better able to deal 
with path dependency through historical analysis. (Bennett 1999, 
p.16)
Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992) show a general chain of causality in 
their examination of various cases of foreign military intervention. The goal of the 
present research is to determine the following chain in die cases examined by 
Levite, Jentleson, and Berman. The authors reveal that the cases of the United 
States in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Syria in Lebanon, Israel in 
Lebanon, and India in Sri Lanka share this chain of causality: 
GOALS>ASSESSMENT>STRATEGIES>OBSTACLES/MISTAKES>OUTCOME 
The study of Plan Colombia under this lens reveals that the United States is heading 
down a strikingly similar path in its Colombian intervention. Specifically, the
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following criteria were present in all of Levite, Jentleson, and Berman's cases, and 
are present in Plan Colombia:
Let us review the United States’ goals in Plan Colombia as they serve to 
further Levite, Jentelson, and Berman’s (1992) model. They are: to strengthen the 
fight against drug trafficking and dismantle the organizations through an integrated 
effort by the armed forces, to strengthen the judicial system and combat corruption, 
to neutralize the drug trade’s financial system and seize its resources for the state, to 
neutralize and combat violent agents allied with the drug trade, to integrate national 
initiatives into regional and international efforts, to strengthen and expand plans for 
alternative development in areas affected by drug trafficking, to increase support for 
human rights and judicial reform, to pursue the expansion of counter-narcotics 
operations into southern Colombia, to develop alternative economic development 
and similar programs for Bolivia and Ecuador, to instigate increased interdiction 
efforts, and, finally, to provide assistance for the Colombian National Police. 
Clearly, several (if not all) of these goals stem from the United States’ primary 
security concerns—making them intrinsic in nature. Additionally, because the 
attainment of these goals would alter the status quo in the target state, Colombia, 
they meet Levite, Jentleson, and Berman’s definition of offensive goals.
Moreover, the United States, as the intervening nation, has made several 
assessments regarding Colombia’s capabilities as an ally and about the course of the 
intervention itself. Those include the following: Colombia is a viable political ally, 
Colombia is sufficiently stable to endure United States intervention, United States 
intervention is the key mechanism by which to attain Colombian and United States’ 
goals, and the United States involvement in Colombia’s countemarcotics operations 
will not lead to involvement with Colombia’s counterinsurgency war.
To achieve the stated and implied goals of Plan Colombia, the United States
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and Colombia are employing both military and political strategies. A brief review 
of these strategies entails the following tactics: Colombia requires United States 
military and financial aid to enact Plan Colombia, military equipment from the 
United States will be effectively used in crop eradication, and Colombian Armed 
Forces and the Colombian National Police require training and assistance from 
United States military and contracted personnel.
As discussed earlier, however, these strategies will not effectively ensure 
that the goals of Plan Colombia are met. Even further, there are significant 
obstacles that stand in the way of the plan’s success. For example, the goals of Plan 
Colombia are inherently ambiguous, as such, it is difficult to measure the relative 
success of the plan’s progression. Additionally, Colombian society is wracked by 
thirty years of civil conflict—the government has lost control of over more than 25% 
of the country, as such, Colombia lacks the internal stability to endure United 
States’ intervention. Furthermore, Colombian policy-makers are relying on U.S. 
intervention to institute stability. In fact, the United States has made several 
misjudgments concerning its military effectiveness in Colombia. Contrary to our 
assessments: intelligence sharing could fall into the hands of rebel groups, the 
delivery and maintenance of military equipment has not met designated 
standards, U.S. technology could very likely fail in the face of guerrilla warfare 
(such as the types employed by Colombian rebel groups), there is little 
accountability for the contracted troops in Colombia, and finally, there is legislation 
in the United States opposing the funding and implementation of Plan Colombia.
Keeping in mind all those factors which work against the success of Plan 
Colombia, an estimation of the intervention’s outcome is not difficult. Considering 
that the United States is guilty of numerous assessment errors, and that the success 
of Plan Colombia is inherently difficult to judge, the United States military
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involvement is likely to become protracted.
Thus, Bennett’s (1999) process tracing method in an analysis of Plan 
Colombia is better able to deal with path dependency through historical analysis of 
Levite, Jentleson, and Berman’s examples.
The glaring caveat of this method is, as Bennett notes, that some processes 
may vary greatly depending on the path-dependent effects of slight differences in 
initial conditions (1999, 16). The conclusion that Plan Colombia fits the model of 
protracted military intervention is, by its nature, hypothetical; only future events will 
provide proof. One cannot ignore Bennett’s warning regarding “slight differences in 
initial conditions.” Certainly, the context of the Colombian conflict is unique and 
conditions surrounding U.S. intervention are case specific.
Even so, Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992) make a strong case for their 
model’s generality. With this in mind, a hypothetical application of Plan Colombia 
to the model of protracted foreign military intervention based on path dependency is 
acceptable.
A second caveat to the research is that some aspects of social opposition to 
Plan Colombia have been intentionally neglected in this research. Specifically, the 
human rights advocacy movement, while pertinent to a study of the plan, has not 
been thoroughly examined. The rapid growth of aid to Colombia has raised 
concerns about its possible contribution to human rights abuses. Today, Colombia’s 
Armed Forces are the hemisphere’s worst abusers of human rights and international 
humanitarian law (Isacson 2000, 8).
The foreign aid and defense-budget appropriations bill contain a set of 
criteria known as the Leahy Amendments. These regulations prohibit units of a 
country’s security forces from receiving assistance if their members face credible 
evidence of gross human rights violations and allow units to receive aid through
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foreign operations-funded programs if “effective measures” are taken to bring the 
accused unit members to justice. The regulations also allow a unit to receive aid 
through defense budget-funded programs under the condition that corrective steps 
are taken (Isacson 2000, 8). The text of the Leahy Law and its accompanying 
appropriations act may be found in the appendix following Chapter 7.
The law’s ambiguity has created a difficult situation for the State and 
Defense Departments, which are trying to resolve basic questions like “what is a 
unit,” and whether a unit that simply transfers offending members out of service 
(rather than bringing them to justice) deserves aid. Isacson (2000) notes, because of 
the lack of specificity, the United States and Colombia have found two ways to 
work around these regulations:
The first is the creation of new military units from scratch, like the 
new countemarcotics battalions. All candidates for the new units 
have their names run through databases of past crimes or human 
rights abuses. In Colombia, where the military is planning a rapid 
expansion, it seems to be proving easier to create new, vetted units 
than to bring abusive officers in the old units to justice. Creating 
new units not only evades the law’s intent, it risks creating an 
“army within an army” that is better equipped and trained than the 
rest of the institution. (Isacson 2000, p.9)
The second manner of evading the law, Isacson (2000) notes, has to do with 
the definition of “unit.” The State and Defense Department have determined that a 
soldier from a banned unit may still receive aid if his individual record is clean. 
Consequently, the Leahy Law only applies to an entire unit when weapons are part
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of the assistance package. Training for a unit guilty of human rights abuses may be 
granted by excluding the unit’s abusive members from training activity.
Isacson (2000) explains the cause for alarm in human rights activists. The 
“units to be trained” issue creates a problem because the Leahy Law was originally 
intended to encourage foreign militaries to stop protecting rights abuses. The “unit 
to be trained” loophole is more of a creative shortcut than a legitimate provision to 
the law. Isacson (2000) notes that it should be alarming that the Colombian military 
receives heavy U.S. assistance despite the fact that it is not willing to punish 
criminals within its ranks (Isacson 2000, p.9).
While human rights concerns are thus justified, this analysis focuses on the 
strategic military tactics involved in intervention. For the sake of time, these 
humanitarian issues must be considered only in the context of background 
influences. The model provided by Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992) focuses 
on the manner in which military assistance is distributed considering military risk, 
with no weight given to the risk of backlash from outside organizations. As such, 
this analysis was limited to an assessment of military success or failure, not a 
justification of military assistance.
A third caveat to this application is the neglect of outside factors which may 
also lead the United States’ intervention to protraction. If history serves as an 
adequate teacher, it is clear that U.S. intervention in Colombia is likely to become 
protracted. All of the requisite conditions are present and met for protracted foreign 
military intervention. Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992) extend their study, 
however, to include conditions which may be responsible for escalation of 
prutraction: military surprise, physical environment, ineffectiveness of intelligence, 
and anti-war sentiment. Although such factors are not considered central to the 
present argument, these conditions certainly warrant brief discussion.
84
Military intervention poses a host of novel military challenges to 
which the intervening power must adapt... .Even when intervention 
is ultimately unsuccessful, a military organization may adapt to its 
problem fairly well. Since... it is difficult to define ultimate 
"success" in any simple way, and since the outcomes of most 
interventions are mixed, how well armies adapt to the wars in which 
they find themselves can be of tremendous importance. (Levite, 
Jentleson, and Berman 1992, p.278)
Intervening armies must be prepared to face several unexpected military and 
political conditions. Initially, intervening armies confront technological surprise. 
Particularly in guerrilla warfare, the intervening army often finds itself unprepared 
for battle. For example, suicide car and truck bombers in Lebanon baffled the 
Israeli Defense Forces. Soviet troops—well equipped with helicopter gunships— 
were startled by relatively simple machine guns in the hands of Afghan guerrillas 
(Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, 278). The United States could easily find 
itself unprepared to tackle guerrilla tactics employed by the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia. While Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992) note that these 
challenges are typically controllable, they may very well undercut an army’s belief 
that superior technology equates to superiority across the board (279).
A second reality that the U.S. contracted and military personnel must take 
into account is the unique physical environment in which war takes place. The 
shuck of different terrain can be quite significant for interventions that take place 
across continents. Modem military interventions are particularly susceptible, as 
differences in climate and terrain are usually important for their effect on tactical
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adequacy (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992,279). The intervening forces in 
Colombia must be prepared to encounter new terrain: especially as they push into 
the forest-laden, southern portions of Colombia—else they risk falling prey to 
military defeat.
Furthermore, intelligence-sharing strategies do not always work. Because 
interventionary warfare poses unusual intelligence requirements, the United States 
may find usually helpful sources of information (e.g. photographic reconnaissance 
and signal intelligence) less helpful than expected. This difficult lesson was learned 
in the Gulf War, as the United States deployed vast imagery and signal intelligence 
to monitor the Iraqi military, but was still left with glaring holes in its intelligence 
analysis (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992,280).
A final consideration that the U.S. must realize is the degree of anti-war 
sentiment it may face:
One group that invariably emerges during., .domestic debates [over 
foreign involvement] consists of what one might call "anti-war 
hawks"~a faction that has no compunctions about the use of force, 
or about the justice of a given war, but believes that the costs of the 
war exceeds its benefits [sic]. Sometimes a large part of the public 
adheres to this view as well, as appears to have been the case of the 
American public in Vietnam. And characteristically it takes a well- 
known hawk to begin the process of winding these wars down 
(Richard Nixon and Yitzhak Rabin are good examples of this). 
(Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, p.282)
Although this analysis does not focus on the anti-intervention movement, it could
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very well play an important role in the escalation of American involvement. Recall 
the human rights advocacy movement discussed earlier, coupled with the pending 
legislation, which deride American involvement in Colombia. The United States’ 
public has become much more cynical since the Vietnam conundrum.
Consequently, policymakers must grapple with legislative decisions under the 
careful watch of a constituency that is all too familiar with the costs of a protracted 
intervention. This will undoubtedly shape the nature of the intervention so that if it 
is to become protracted, the probability that it will escalate into a full-blown war 
(similar to that in Vietnam) is slim.
87
Chapter 7: Conclusions and Implications
Military intervention mandated in Plan Colombia has a strong likelihood of 
becoming protracted, and, consequently, it is necessary to review some implications 
of protracted foreign military intervention. A consideration of the generalities that 
Levite, Jentleson, and Berman found true across the spectrum of their studies will 
help policy makers and scholars predict the outcome of Plan Colombia.
Specifically: foreign military intervention is dynamic, there is a high degree of 
uncertainty to undertaking foreign military intervention, foreign military 
intervention is complex, extensive destructiveness is wrought by foreign military 
intervention, and there exists a lack of comparative thinking in the decision to 
intervene.
The inherent dynamism of foreign military intervention creates a constant 
need for reassessment of goals, objectives, tactics, and strategies. Yet, as Levite, 
Jentleson, and Berman (1992) note, this is a need which (for reasons of capability 
and disposition) policy makers have difficulty meeting. The major pressures that 
the intervener faces once troops have been committed call for the intensification of 
military activity, rather than an evaluation of tactics or a reassessment of political 
objectives. At all three stages of the intervention (getting in, staying in, and getting 
out) decision-making happens too little, too late (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 
1992, p.304)
The high degree of uncertainty inherent to undertaking foreign military 
intervention further complicates the dilemma. While criticisms of poor intelligence, 
flawed or biased decision-making, and other controllable factors are worthwhile, the 
degree of uncertainty lies mainly within the ability to differentiate between that 
which could have been known but was not. In other words, even if intelligence 
agencies behaved optimally, decision makers used the intelligence effectively, and
88
there was no bias in the decision making process, uncertainty concerning the final 
outcome of the intervention would still prevail (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, 
304).
Third, the complexity of the phenomenon is certainly noteworthy. By 
nature of the enterprise, interveners face massive tasks. Levite, Jentleson, and 
Berman (1992) contend that sending troops into states which are ridden by deep 
divisions and tom by violent conflicts is paramount to taking on goals and 
objectives of great magnitude and complexity. This involves not just restraining or 
otherwise changing the behavior of another state, but remaking the essential nature 
and structure of the domestic political order as well. The authors surmise: “Winning 
over hearts and minds of a people is a much more complex undertaking than 
defeating an opposing army” (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992,305). Certainly, 
this generality must be considered as the United States attempts to restructure 
Colombia's political landscape.
Fourth, the destructiveness described in all of Levite, Jentleson, and 
Berman's case studies (1992) should serve as a precaution to country's 
contemplating intervention. The authors found that the longer the intervention lasts, 
the greater the volume of destructiveness it wreaks, "not merely as a mathematical 
function of the duration of the fighting, but also due to the self-feeding dynamic of 
the intervention itself which requires or legitimizes. ..less restrictive use of force on 
all sides to get results'' (305). As such, the United States should carefully weigh the 
proposed time frame of Plan Colombia. In six years of operations, there will be 
countless opportunities to further protraction.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 
(1992) observed in all of their case studies a lack of comparative thinking, which 
resulted in limited learning by interveners. The authors explain that policy makers
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and elites may very well recall past experiences of intervention—both successful and 
disastrous-but they do not often act on these recollections:
That policy makers may not draw on lessons or make the analogies 
effectively, and otherwise misuse historical analysis, is a separate 
point. They also show a tendency to feel bound by earlier decisions 
pertaining to the country in question, whether made by themselves 
or their predecessors. Yet there is little evidence in any of the cases, 
whether because they deemed them irrelevant and/or for lack of 
knowledge, about questions asked or analyses posed based on other 
countries’ experiences. (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992,306)
Thus, the United States appears to be victim to a trend that Levite, Jentleson, and 
Berman discovered true in all of their case examples: deciding to intervene without 
giving proper consideration or weight to historical experiences.
A final observation which deserves attention is the international context of 
the intervention. As mentioned earlier, stability in Latin America is not a guarantee. 
The waves stirred by Colombian conflicts have already reached the shores of 
neighboring countries, none of which can afford additional turmoil. Peter Hakim, in 
“The Uneasy Americas” (2001), notes that in Peru, the government of Alberto 
Fujimori grew increasingly autocratic and corrupt until it finally imploded in 2000. 
Now Peru must face the task of rebuilding its institutions. At the same time, 
Colombia’s elected government is losing control while democratic institutions are 
being battered by a relentless guerrilla war, horrendous human rights abuses, and 
pervasive criminal violence. Ecuador recently suffered South America’s first 
successful military coup in 24 years, and furthermore, in Venezuela, political power
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is being concentrated in the hands of President Hugo Chavez, who scorns 
representative democracy. Even in those Andean countries where democracy has 
been established and maintained, political institutions (parties, legislatures, and 
courts) perform dismally (Hakim 2001, 49), Thus policy makers must he especially 
cautious in the implementation of Plan Colombia—undoubtedly, there will be 
international consequences.
These generalizations create a critical implication for die United States' 
intervention as it is mandated in Plan Colombia. The value of comparative thinking 
is considerable, as Levite, Jentleson, and Berman attempt to argue. It can be used to 
sensitize analysts as well as policy makers and their advisors to the features and 
dilemmas inherent in the nature of foreign military intervention. If the United States 
and Colombian policy makers convert to a strategy of narcotics control based on a 
comparative perspective of intervention, it would be easier to devise an integrated 
politico-military strategy for intervention that takes into account the complications 
that are likely to arise along the way. Additionally, this comparative perspective 
could result in a conscious choice to forego military intervention and pursue some 
alternative strategy (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992, 307). The authors of 
Foreign Military Intervention desire to influence decision makers to adopt a 
comparative perspective in the hopes that foreign military intervention may, in the 
future, be abandoned for alternative strategies. Colombia is a key test case for this 
objective-but only if policy makers begin to think in a comparative frame.
Ethyl Lynn Beers wrote: "Defend me from my friends, I can protect myself 
from my enemies," Certainly, her words carry weight in the sphere of global 
politics and interventions. Levite, Jentleson, and Berman (1992) supply their 
readers with several studies of foreign military interventions in which friendly 
action resulted in disastrous results. The commonalities of all these cases include
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ambiguous goals, misassessments, military ineffectiveness, and outside obstacles. 
Consequently, each case resulted in protraction of the intervention and frequently, 
outright failure of the intervention.
The application of these criteria to Plan Colombia reveals that the United 
States is hurdling down a dangerously familiar path. In fact, contrary to strategic 
and theoretical goals, Plan Colombia—and the international aid mandated therein— 
very likely will only exacerbate the civil conflict in Colombia. Unless United States 
and Colombian policy makers adopt a more cautious and comparative frame of 
thought in the implementation and amendment of Plan Colombia, both countries 
may find themselves at a startling loss. As history has shown, and is continuing to 
show today, sometimes friends can be one's worst enemies.
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Appendix
HR 1591: The Andean Region Contractor Accountability Act
A BILL
To prohibit the United States Government from providing financing for 
nongovernmental organizations or individuals to carry out military, law 
enforcement, armed rescue, or other related operations in the countries of the 
Andean Region, including any operations relating to narcotics control efforts.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House o f Representatives o f the United 
States o f America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
This act may be cited as the 'Andean Region Contractor Accountability
Act.’
SECTION 2. FINDINGS
Congress finds the following:
(1) Hundreds of civilians, including many United States citizens, 
are working
with the military and police forces of the Republic of Colombia 
and other countries of the Andean region under contracts 
between the United States
Government and several private corporations. The duties of 
such individuals include piloting drug-crop fumigation aircraft, 
flying helicopters transporting army battalions, serving as 
mechanics and logistics personnel, assisting the 
reform of the security forces, performing armed search-and-
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rescue missions, and gathering aerial intelligence, among 
others.
(2) On February 18,2001, United States contractor personnel on a 
search-and- rescue mission in the guerrilla-held zone of Curillo, 
in Colombia’s Caquela region, were involved in an exchange of 
fire with members of Colombia’s FARC guerrilla groups, 
raising concerns about force protection and proximity to 
Colombia’s conflict.
(3) According to the Inspector General of the Department of State, 
three United States contract personnel have died while piloting 
spray planes over Colombian territory since 1997.
(4) Contract personnel are being employed in circumstances and 
locations in Colombia which, for force protection reasons, 
would generally be off-limits to uniformed United States 
personnel.
(5) Increasing use of private contract personnel raises questions of 
accountability and transparency in the management of United 
States policy toward Colombia and other countries of the 
Andean region.
(6) On April 20, 2001, a plane operated by innocent United States 
civilians conducting missionary work was shot down in the
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airspace of the Republic of Peru. The plane was targeted as a 
result of intelligence sharing between Central Intelligence 
Agency-contracted private military personnel and Peruvian 
authorities. As a result, Veronica ‘Roni’ Rowers* and her 7- 
month old daughter Charity were killed.
(7) Basic information about the extent of activities of private 
military contractors in Colombia and in other countries of 
Andean region is generally unavailable to the public.
SECTION 3. PROHIBITION ON FINANCING OF PRIVATE MILITARY, 
LAW ENFORCEMENT, OR ARMED RESCUE OPERATIONS IN ANDEAN 
REGION COUNTRIES.
(a) PROHIBITION-Notwithstanding chapter 8 of part I of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 or any other provision of law, no officer or employee of the 
United States Government may enter into a contract or other agreement under which 
the United States Government provides financing, in whole or part, for a 
nongovernmental organization (including a corporation or other business entity) or 
individual to carry out military, law enforcement, armed rescue, or other related 
operations in the countries of the Andean region, including any operations relating 
to narcotics control efforts.
(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION-Nothing in subsection (a) shall be 
construed to prohibit the financing, in whole or part, for a nongovernmental 
organization (including a corporation or other business entity) or individual to carry
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out humanitarian activities, including the delivery of food, in the countries of the 
Andean region.
SECTION 4. DEFINITION
In this act, the term ‘countries of the Andean region’ means the Republic of 
Bolivia, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the RepubUc of Ecuador, the Republic of 
Colombia, the Republic of Panama, the Republic of Peru, and the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela.
Source: (http://thomas.loc.gOv/cgi-bin/querv/D7el07:l :./temp/~cl07zpRN6C::l
Leahv Law
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations 
Act, 2000:
Section 564
None of the funds made available by this Act may be provided to any unit of the 
security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence 
that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights, unless the Secretary 
determines and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that the government of 
such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the 
security forces unit to justice:
Provided, that nothing in this section shall be construed to withhold funds made 
available by this Act from any unit of the security forces of a foreign country not 
credibly alleged to be involved in gross violations of human rights:
Provided further, that in the event that funds are withheld from any unit pursuant to
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this section, the Secretary of State shall promptly inform the foreign government of 
the basis for such action and shall, to the maximum extent practicable, assist in the 
foreign government in taking effective measures to bring the responsible members 
of the security forces to justice.
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2000 
Section 8098.
(a) Prohibition—None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to 
support any training program involving a unit of the security forces of a 
foreign country if the Secretary of Defense has received credible 
information from the Department of State that the unit has committed a 
gross violation of human rights, unless all necessary corrective steps have 
been taken.
(b) Monitoring—The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary 
of State, shall ensure that prior to a decision to conduct any training 
program referred to in subsection (a), full consideration is given to all 
credible information available to the Department of State relating to human 
rights violations by foreign security forces.
(c) Waiver—The Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Secretary of 
State, may waive the prohibition in subsection (a) if he determines that such 
waiver is required by extraordinary circumstances.
(d) Report—Not more than 15 days after the exercise of any waiver under 
subsection (c), the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report to the 
congressional defense committees describing the extraordinary 
circumstances, the purpose and duration of the training program, the United 
States forces and the foreign security forces involved in the training 
program, and the information relating to human rights violations that
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necessitates the waiver.
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